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ABSTRACT 
Recently, a major decision was made by the Navy to eliminate a key capability from the 
future ship of the amphibious fleet. The removal of the well deck from the future 
LHA (R) amphibious assault ship is attempting to change the way the Navy and Marine 
Corps have conducted amphibious operations over the past several decades. This thesis 
will look at the current and future amphibious capabilities in order to develop equations 
to quantitatively analyze the lift capabilities associated with future design choices to 
determine the effects of changing the design in the LHA (R) class of amphibious assault 
ships. A comparative analysis of the tradeoffs, capabilities, and limitations associated 
with and without having a well deck was completed in order to determine the most 
effective means to operate. By looking at data on the MV-22 Osprey and F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter, such as lift capabilities and ranges, and comparing it to the various landing 
craft data (LCACs, LCUs and AAVs), this thesis will determine the effects on mission 
capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps. 
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A. DISCUSSION AND PURPOSE 
Amphibious warfare has always played a vital role in missions and operations for 
the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Both services have come together, particularly 
during and after World War II, to develop unique and specific amphibious concepts and 
principles along with specialized ships and equipment to perform a variety of amphibious 
missions that no other force in the world can rival. Recently, a decision was made by the 
Navy to eliminate a major capability from the future ship of the amphibious fleet. With a 
shift in design to eliminate the well deck in the new LHA (R) America class of 
amphibious assault ships, Navy and Marine Corps amphibious warfare capabilities and 
concepts are being forced to fit into a new system. Recent operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have pushed for an enhanced aviation capability on board LHAs and LHDs, 
which began the shift in thought and design for the new LHA (R). The issue here is that 
the shift in design solves the current problems only and does not look beyond the Middle 
East to future conflicts. As stated by retired Marine Major-General William Whitlow on 
the new class of amphibious ships: 
The LHA-R should be capable of handling legacy air assets and future 
ones that are different size and weight. It should have the ability to switch 
out modules to convert into a command and control ship. It should not be 
a single-purpose ship. An aviation-only capable ship would be very short 
sighted. Any future ship should be built from the keel up to be able to 
adapt to a myriad of capabilities. (Sullivan 9) 
The United States military prides itself as being the most capable, flexible and 
strongest force in the world. While design decisions may be costly, it should not limit the 
warfighter and be the sole criteria in decision making. Limiting our capabilities while 
foreign and non-state actors become stronger and more unpredictable will negatively 
impact our forces; therefore it is necessary to analyze these affects and make appropriate 
recommendations for future designs. 
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A full analysis on the elimination of the well deck and a reduction in capabilities 
on board the new America class amphibious assault ships was never conducted in the 
program’s original Analysis of Alternatives study performed by the Center for Naval 
Analyses or looked at once the final design was approved. The Navy and Marine Corps 
are now scrambling to understand how these new design decisions will affect the 
amphibious fleet and future missions while the first ship in the America class is being 
constructed. The purpose of this thesis is to supplement the research and analysis 
currently being done on this subject and to rigorously investigate General Whitlow’s 
assertion in order to determine how this will affect the capabilities of the Navy and 
Marine Corps and ultimately recommend a proposed amphibious model. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary focus of this thesis is to answer the question of how a shift in 
amphibious warfare design decisions will affect military capabilities. Specifically, this 
thesis will look at how losing the well deck capability in the newly designed LHA (R) 
America class will affect operational mentality and mission capability in amphibious 
warfare. A secondary question this thesis will answer is how design decisions are made in 
the Department of Defense in order to uncover why such a critical capability was 
eliminated in the future amphibious assault ship. 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The main research method used to develop this thesis was an extensive literature 
review of books, government reports and studies, and Internet articles. Personal 
interviews with key personnel in the amphibious warfare field of expertise were also 
conducted to gain firsthand knowledge and gather data. Once all of the data were 
collected, a comparative analysis was performed on the current and future amphibious 
capabilities in order to develop lift equations to quantitatively determine the effects of 
changing the design of amphibious assault ships. From the analysis results a 
recommended amphibious model is proposed. 
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D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into the following chapters: 
 Chapter I is the introduction and describes the overview of the thesis. 
 Chapter II provides background information on amphibious warfare, 
reviews key amphibious warfare doctrine, and discusses the current LHA 
lift capabilities and configurations. 
 Chapter III describes the changes in organizational amphibious design 
with an overview of the new LHA America class lift capabilities and 
configurations. This chapter also discusses how design decisions are made 
by exploring the Department of Defense’s acquisition life cycle and 
reviews previous design models to develop lessons learned. 
 Chapter IV discusses the results of the comparative amphibious model 
data analysis. The lift equations are developed in this chapter to assess the 
impacts of the design change and provide a proposed amphibious model. 
 Chapter V provides the research conclusions and recommendations for 
future work in this topic. 
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The United States military has been conducting amphibious operations since the 
Battle of Nassau during the Revolutionary War in 1776, to the shores of Tripoli at the 
Battle of Derna in 1805, and during the Mexican-American War at the Battle of 
Chapultepec in 1847 (“History: A Commitment to Our Nation Since 1775”). However, it 
was during World War II in which the Navy and Marine Corps established concepts and 
doctrine for what is known today as modern amphibious warfare tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (Jacob 2). The war in the Pacific was truly a naval battle fought between two 
super powers in which amphibious operations proved to be the essential element 
necessary to propel the United States to victory. The great battles fought at Midway, 
Coral Sea, Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal, and Okinawa shaped the Navy and Marine Corps’ 
amphibious doctrine to what it is today (“World War II-Asiatic-Pacific Theater 1941–
1946”). 
Although both Japan and Germany sought hegemony in their areas of the world, it 
is only the United States that developed a significant amphibious capability. Japan and 
the U.S. had quite different approaches to amphibious raids, landings, and assaults. 
Before the U.S. entered World War II, Japan was able to extend their empire across the 
entire Pacific Ocean relatively unopposed, which in all probably led them to developing 
such benign tactics. Surprisingly too that it was the Japanese Army and not the Imperial 
Navy that took the lead and established crude amphibious warfare tactics. Unlike the 
U.S., Japan never developed and specialized in amphibious ships or craft as their doctrine 
remained true to favoring the use of carriers and aircraft to battle enemy forces. Japan is a 
particularly interesting case in that their ambitions in the Pacific would require the 
landing of significant occupational forces yet they ignored the proven concepts of 
amphibious raids, landings, and assaults as a means of inserting troops into hostile areas. 
The United States, on the other hand, entered the war with Japan already settled in bases 
and established throughout the islands of the Pacific. It would be the destiny of the U.S. 
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naval forces to develop amphibious warfare concepts as the Allied troops stormed from 
island to island in the Pacific theater. Therefore, the U.S. had a distinct requirement to 
create and seize advanced naval bases from enemy territory and alone identified the need 
to conduct opposed amphibious landings (Millett 50–59). The key element of success for 
the United States was the Marine Corps, as they were the highly trained, mobile, and 
agile force that would lead this island hopping campaign across the Pacific Imperial 
Empire. The U.S. applied a direct approach to war by attacking Japan’s strengths, seeking 
out their main forces, and destroying them. The Marine Corps’ amphibious doctrine 
emphasized daylight, early morning assaults, vice the traditional surprise night attacks, in 
order to maximize the hours of daylight to establish the beachhead. Traditional thinking 
centered on surprise and chaos during night attacks. The U.S., however, eschewed that 
policy and showed little interest in the element of surprise. Their focus shifted to the 
maximum use of strategic and operational resources, such as shore bombardment, 
strategic bombing, massing of troops, and overwhelming firepower to destroy the enemy. 
Since the terrain in the Pacific islands made it almost impossible to avoid Japanese main 
bodies of defense, opposed landings accompanied with a pre-invasion bombardment 
became routine for the U.S. landing forces. It was under these conditions that led the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps developed the foundation of today’s conduct of amphibious 
operations (“WWII Amphibious Warfare”). 
The years following World War II led to the United States further developing and 
specializing in what are today’s amphibious assault ships, the LHA (Amphibious Assault 
Ship, General Purpose) Class and LHD (Amphibious Assault Ship, Multipurpose) Class. 
Each brought a versatile asset to the fleet by allowing Naval and Marine forces to 
 sail into harm’s way and provide a rapid buildup of combat power ashore in the face  
of the adversary (“United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious Assault Ships 
LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). The U.S. is the leading world power when it comes to developing 
and designing amphibious assault ships and in conducting a variety of amphibious 
operations. Currently, no other country in the world has a better trained and equipped 
amphibious fleet than the United States Navy and Marine Corps. While world powers, 
such as the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and France each have a naval force with 
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amphibious capabilities, none rival the U.S. fleet, making it the best and most unique on 
the planet. The recent wars and conflicts in the Middle East have created a shift in 
military thinking as the enemy has become less and less accessible to coastal forces 
causing many countries to move away from traditional amphibious landings. The British 
have scaled down their amphibious fleet in recent years, having only two large deck 
amphibious ships at their disposal. The Royal Marines have been greatly reduced while 
amphibious training has become nonexistent (“IHS Jane’s: Defense & Security 
Intelligence & Analysis”). France has maintained a small fleet of amphibious assault 
ships, numbering two Foudre class Amphibious Transport Docks (LPDs) and two Mistral 
class LHDs. Missions of the French amphibious fleet center on humanitarian and non-
combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and have little to no involvement in combat 
missions (Annati 1–2, 7–8). Post-Cold War Russia does not have an amphibious 
capability but is taking a radical step in purchasing several Mistral class LHDs from the 
French over the next decade. Russia has bought into the amphibious capability in order to 
control and protect their country’s vast littoral regions and to spark their troubled 
shipbuilding industry (“Russia Orders French Mistral Amphibious Assault Ships”). China 
is also making improvements to their fleet with the addition of several Yuzhao Type 071 
amphibious vessels to their arsenal, which resemble a U.S. LPD. The roles these vessels 
are expected to play in include humanitarian aid and disaster relief, maritime security 
operations, and NEO (O’Rourke 25–27). Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the 
number of major mission area amphibious ships that the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, China, and Russia have had in service from 1980 and projected out to 2020.   
Landing craft utilities (LCUs) were included in China’s amphibious ship count because 
their current amphibious strategy involved the use of LCUs as a major mission area ship 
that had self-sustaining capabilities for several weeks patrolling coastal waters. 
 8 
 
Figure 1.   Major Mission Area Amphibious Ships (After “IHS Jane’s: Defense & 
Security Intelligence & Analysis”). 
In comparison with the other world super powers, the U.S. has a vast amphibious 
force, numbering 31 active ships in service. The U.S. amphibious assault ships are 
involved in a variety of operations, from projection of power and combat operations to 
humanitarian aid and NEO. The unique, multipurpose capabilities of amphibious assault 
ships are why they can be tasked with a wide variety of missions. Projection of power 
and combat operations are the primary tasks of the U.S. amphibious assault ships. 
Projection of power from a Navy and Marine Corps standpoint means to deploy assets 
overseas to areas of interest that are typically inaccessible in order to intimidate or deter 
nations from conducting any egregious acts. Examples of projection of power missions 
include routine deployments to the Persian Gulf that show U.S. presence in an area of 
conflict. Projection of power missions may turn into combat operations if hostilities 
escalate in which Navy and Marine Corps forces would already be in a strategically 
placed environment to conduct offensive operations of landing the Marines ashore. What 
makes the U.S. amphibious fleet such a distinctive, dominant force is their ability to sail 
anywhere in the world, deter aggression, access impenetrable areas, and defend and 
 9 
protect sea lanes for shipping and transport worldwide.    The ability to reach an area 
without proper port facilities around the globe is what makes the United States Navy and 
Marine Corps the most capable and credible force in the world. 
While the primary mission of amphibious assault ships is to conduct amphibious 
operations by transporting Marines and their equipment to the combat area, secondary 
missions include humanitarian aid and disaster relief in large part because of their various 
resources and assets, such as having a large medical facility on board and ability to 
transport and store a large amount of supplies and equipment (“United States Navy Fact 
File: Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). Humanitarian missions have 
aided a countless number of people around the world, especially these areas impacted by 
natural disasters. Amphibious assault ships were first on the scene following the 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011, took charge at home off the coast of New 
Orleans, Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina ravished the area in 2005, and were there 
supporting Thailand and the Philippines after the deadly earthquake and tsunami in 2004. 
It was the amphibious fleet that had the ability to help these devastated areas because 
they could easily gain access to ports that were no longer functional and operate where 
ports no longer existed. With the rise in number of routine and emergency humanitarian 
operations, the U.S. Navy is certainly living up to its image as a “Global Force for 
Good.”  While the Navy may not be conducting ship to ship gun battles on the high seas 
or performing opposed amphibious landings on the isles of the Pacific on a daily basis in 
this era of conflict, the humanitarian operations they are performing day after day 
preserve peace and security while preventing chaos and terrorism from reigning. 
Over the past twenty years, both LHAs and LHDs have been tasked with more 
humanitarian operations than combat operations. As seen in Table 1, of the 130 primary 
mission types assigned to LHAs and LHDs from 1979 to 2006, 32 were humanitarian 
(24%) and 20 were combat (15%). Projection of power, one of the United States 
military’s main objectives, was the most assigned mission, numbering 43 (33%). Tables 2 
and 3 break these figures down into two separate time frames: Cold War era operations 
from 1979 to 1991 and Post-Cold War era operations from 1992 to 2006. During the Cold 
War period, humanitarian operations totaled the highest with 10 (33%), projection of 
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power was second with nine (30%), and combat operations was third with a total of four 
(13%). The Post–Cold War period saw a dramatic increase in number of operations due 
to various conflicts and operations in the Middle East and following the attacks on 
11 September 2001. Power projection operations rose to the highest spot numbering 
34 (34%), followed by humanitarian operations at 22 (22%), and combat operations at 
16 (16%) (McCarton B-1–B-7). One possible explanation for the rise in humanitarian 
operations is the unfortunate number of disasters occurring around the world and the 
United States being able to send in relief, aid, and assistance by utilizing the Navy and 
Marine Corps assets. Because of their versatile capabilities, including the combined 
ability to conduct air and landing craft operations, their ability to reach inaccessible ports, 
and operate without port facilities, amphibious assault ships have been traditionally 
assigned the humanitarian task. The emphasis on humanitarian operations has also 
renewed and validated the need for America’s Navy to have and maintain a significant 
amphibious capability to support the “Global Force for Good” claim in order to continue 
to supply aid and relief around the world. These data also show that amphibious assault 
ships have had significant contributions to the wars of the past two decades, specifically 
in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom. The other primary operational category types that LHAs and LHDs were 
assigned can be seen in Table 1. The capability of dual air and landing craft operability 
allows amphibious assault ships to accomplish all of these various missions and will be a 









Table 1.   Operations from 1976–2006 (After McCarton B-1–B-7). 
Operations From 1976 to 2006 
Operation Type Number of Operations Percent (%) 
Power Projection 43 33 
Humanitarian 32 24 
Combat Operations 20 15 
Special Operations 8 6 
Maritime Interdiction Operations 6 5 
Surge Deployment 6 5 
Law Enforcement 5 4 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 5 4 
TRAP Operations 4 3 
Peacekeeping 1 1 
Total 130  
Table 2.   Cold War Operations from 1979–1991 (After McCarton B-1–B-7). 
Operations From 1979 to 1991 
Operation Type Number of Operations Percent (%) 
Humanitarian 10 33 
Power Projection 9 30 
Combat Operations 4 13 
Law Enforcement 3 10 
Special Operations 2 7 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 1 3.5 
Surge Deployment 1 3.5 
Total 30   
Table 3.   Post-Cold War Operations from 1992–2006  
(After McCarton B-1–B-7). 
Operations From 1992 to 2006 
Operation Type Number of Operations Percent (%) 
Power Projection 34 34 
Humanitarian 22 22 
Combat Operations 16 16 
Maritime Interdiction Operations 6 6 
Special Operations 6 6 
Surge Deployment 5 5 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 4 4 
TRAP Operations 4 4 
Law Enforcement 2 2 
Peacekeeping 1 1 
Total 100   
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Sent out to accomplish these missions and operations are the LHA and LHD 
amphibious assault ships, which are the largest warships of their kind in the world. The 
purpose of these ships is to carry Marines and their equipment and supplies to the 
amphibious assault objective area and support the Marine Corps tenets of Operational 
Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM). The three 
classes of amphibious assault ships, or “big deck amphibs,” are the LHA Tarawa class, 
LHD Wasp class, and LHA (R) America class. Each ship in service from the classes can 
be seen in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The ships of the LHA Tarawa class are the oldest of the 
amphibs and have only two ships remaining in service. The LHD Wasp class has eight 
ships in service. The third and newest LHA (R) America class will have its first ship in 
service by 2013, USS America, LHA 6 (“United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious 
Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). 
Table 4.   LHA Tarawa Class (After “United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious  
Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). 
LHA Tarawa Class 
Hull Number Name 
LHA 4 USS Nassau 
LHA 5 USS Peleliu 
Table 5.   LHD Wasp Class (After “United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious  
Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). 
LHD Wasp Class 
Hull Number Name 
LHD 1 USS Wasp 
LHD 2 USS Essex 
LHD 3 USS Kearsarge 
LHD 4 USS Boxer 
LHD 5 USS Bataan 
LHD 6 USS Bonhomme Richard 
LHD 7 USS Iwo Jima 




Table 6.   LHA (R) America Class (After “United States Navy Fact File:  
Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). 
LHA (R) America Class 
Hull Number Name 
LHD 6 USS America 
LHD 7 TBD 
LHD 8 TBD 
 
LHAs and LHDs resemble small aircraft carriers and have the capability to 
conduct both rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft operations. Typical rotary wing aircraft, 
or helicopters, that are able to fly on board and be maintained by the crew include CH-46 
Sea Knights, CH-53 Sea Stallions, UH-1 Hueys, AH-1 Super Cobras, MH-60 Seahawks, 
and MV-22 Ospreys. Currently, the only fixed wing aircraft, or strike fighter jet, that can 
embark on board amphibious assault ships are AV-8B Harriers since they have the 
ability to take off on a shorter flight deck and land vertically. Amphibious ships do not 
have a catapult or arresting wire system like those on an aircraft carrier and require fixed 
wing aircraft to take off on their own power and land vertically back on the flight deck 
(“United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA[R]”). 
Replacing the Harrier jet in the near future will be the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in which 
the Marine Corps variant will be capable of a vertical/short take-off and landing. In terms 
of lift and transport of equipment, the CH-46 Sea Knight, CH-53 Sea Stallion, and MV-
22 Osprey are the work horse of the Marine Air Combat Element (ACE). Each helicopter 
has the ability to carry combat ready Marines and transport a light to medium load of 
equipment and supplies from ship to shore. All are also very useful during humanitarian 
aid and disaster relief operations with the transport of supplies and personnel along with 
the ability to fly over inaccessible areas to perform reconnaissance and search and rescue. 
The AH-1 Super Cobra, AV-8B Harrier, and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are the fire power 
of the Marine ACE. They are the strike aircraft that perform close air support for ground 
troops and battlespace preparation and bombardment for amphibious landings. The 
fighter aircraft do not have any lift or transport capabilities and would therefore are not 
considered an asset in humanitarian operations. 
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The characterizing versatile asset of amphibious assault ships is their ability to 
operate aircraft and landing craft simultaneously due to a large flight deck and floodable 
well deck. While flight decks of all sizes are common amongst warships, the well deck is 
the defining feature of amphibious ships. Well decks are large, open areas located at the 
waterline of ships that can be flooded using ballast tanks to allow smaller water craft to 
enter and leave the ship. They were added to the design of the first purpose-based 
amphibious assault ship, the LHA, in the 1970s in order to best aid the Marines in getting 
ashore by air and sea (Harrison 1). The various landing craft made for amphibious ship 
well decks include Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCACs), Landing Craft Utilities 
(LCUs), and Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) (“United States Navy Fact File: 
Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). LCACs, LCUs and AAVs are all 
means in which Marines and their equipment can travel ashore. LCACs are high speed 
craft that use a cushion to hover on top of the water and over beaches to transport 
personnel, weapons, equipment, and cargo from ship to shore (“United States Navy Fact 
File: Landing Craft, Air Cushioned”). LCUs, resembling the landing craft used in World 
War II, also transport Marines, equipment and cargo ashore but at much lower speeds 
(“United States Navy Fact File: Landing Craft, Mechanized and Utility (LCM/LCU)”). 
AAVs are armored amphibious vehicles used to transport combat equipped Marines 
ashore in hostile environments (“AAV-7 Amphibious Assault Vehicle”). In terms of lift, 
the landing craft carry all the heavy equipment and vehicles from ship to shore. LCACs 
and LCUs are vital to amphibious operations as they can transport all the necessary 
equipment and supplies ashore while personnel are being delivered by helicopter. AAVs 
supply armor and defensive firepower as they head towards shore in hostile environments 
and provide the ground element as a troop transport carrier once on land. LCACs and 
LCUs are also key assets in humanitarian operations as they too can reach inaccessible 
areas of ports, transport supplies and personnel to and from the ship, and maneuver in the 
shallow littorals and coastal waters. AAVs would not be the ideal landing craft to use in 
humanitarian aid since it is a combat vehicle. Plus LCACs and LCUs have a larger 
carrying capacity, maneuver at greater speeds, and are typically a more reliable asset. The 
ability of amphibious assault ships to perform landing craft and aircraft operations at 
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once or separately is what makes this an advantageous asset for the Navy and Marine 
Corps to use in any environment. If flying conditions are poor and helicopters are not an 
option, then landing craft may be able to accomplish the mission and vice versa. The well 
deck in combination with the flight deck is what makes the amphibious assault ship the 
most resourceful and flexible platform in the Navy’s arsenal. 
The new America class LHAs that will replace the aging Tarawa class LHAs, 
will, however, be a different breed of amphibious assault ships. The well deck, the 
defining amphibious ship feature, will not be included in the construction of LHA 6 and 
LHA 7. Instead, the America class will rely solely on aviation capabilities to land 
Marines ashore. The new amphibious platform will be able to embark the typical rotary 
and fixed wing aircraft, but the majority will be the MV-22 Osprey and F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter, which does not allow for continuous lift of personnel, equipment, cargo and 
vehicles ashore (“United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious Assault Ships 
LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). This is a dramatic shift in amphibious assault ship design and will 
alter the way amphibious operations are planned and executed from both a Navy and 
Marine Corps point of view. The shift in amphibious design decision is the focus of this 
thesis and will determine how the Navy and Marine Corps will be affected by losing a 
critical capability they have come to rely on for decades. 
B. DOCTRINE 
A key component in the United States’ development of amphibious warfare 
tactics is the establishment of written doctrine, policies, and principles that direct the 
warfighters in battle. Military doctrine defines and describes the best way to conduct 
operations and acts as a guide for military forces to support national objectives (Joint 
Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
102). Doctrines are living documents that can be modified and updated to reflect the 
changing world to incorporate new tactics, techniques, and procedures. In amphibious 
warfare, the three key doctrinal pieces that guide planning and execution of amphibious 
operations are 1) Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), 2) Ship-to-Objective 
Maneuver (STOM), and 3) the Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. Each reflect 
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the current model of conducting amphibious operations and represent the conceptual 
organizational design and capabilities required to accomplish amphibious warfare 
missions. Specifying the classification of missions assigned to amphibious assault ships 
is the guidance set forth in the directives by President Barack Obama in the 2010 
National Security Strategy and are reflected in the 2011 National Military Strategy. 
1. Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) 
The development of the OMFTS concept is a way for the Navy and Marine Corps 
to meet the challenge of “chaos in the littorals,” or coastal waters, and winning decisive 
victories in these areas of conflict where land and water meet. OMFTS relies on the 
ability to maneuver naval forces at the operational level directly against the enemy’s 
center of gravity in order to exploit the adversary’s weakness and deliver a decisive blow. 
The operational level of war is where major operations and campaigns are planned, 
conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or operational 
areas (Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms 252). The enemy’s center of gravity is their source of power that 
provides moral or physical strength and allows them the freedom and/or will to act (Joint 
Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
46). The enemy’s center of gravity, however, may not always be accessible from the sea, 
as seen in today’s conflict in Afghanistan. Amphibious operations and the OMFTS 
principles would obviously not be the first choice in military strategic planning for 
conducting offensive maneuvers in a land-locked area like Afghanistan, but can aid in a 
supporting role by transporting troops and equipment overseas to the area of conflict. 
The defining characteristic of OMFTS is the extensive use of the sea to gain the 
upper hand by using it as a means of friendly movement while creating a barrier to the 
enemy. Examples of this concept include sea-based logistics and sea-based fire support 
along with using the sea for tactical and operational movement (Operational Maneuver 
from the Sea 5). As improvements in equipment, technological advances in weapon 
systems, and decreases in fuel requirements in land vehicles continue, it will result in a 
decreased need to form beachheads for supply facilities ashore and allow for a faster 
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ship-to-shore movement without the traditional “operational pause” to arrive at the 
objective area at a much greater pace (Operational Maneuver from the Sea 5–6). This is 
an important concept of OMFTS because it will keep the enemy from regrouping, allow 
friendly forces to maintain pressure, and not expose friendly supply chains for the enemy 
to exploit, compromise, or destroy. Improvements and advancements in weapon systems, 
equipment, and vehicles directly affect amphibious operational requirements as it allows 
for a smoother transition from ship to shore in which there is greater stability in the 
establishment of the beachhead in both a combat and logistic sense. Decreasing the 
supply footprint ashore removes a critical vulnerability and allows the landing force to 
continuously press forward and pressure the enemy. The six principles of OMFTS focus 
on this concept of matching strength against weakness to overwhelm and pressure the 
adversary. The six principles are: 
 OMFTS focuses on an operational objective. 
 OMFTS uses the sea as maneuver space. 
 OMFTS generates overwhelming tempo and momentum. 
 OMFTS pits strengths against weakness. 
 OMFTS emphasizes intelligence, deceptions, and flexibility. 
 OMFTS integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets. 
The most crucial and often the most difficult aspect to integrate into the OMFTS 
principles is a command and control system that can execute rapid decision making at all 
levels and demonstrate the ability to operate with speed and flexibility that ultimately 
translates into a high operational tempo (Operational Maneuver from the Sea 6). Success 
of OMFTS relies heavily on the Navy and Marine Corps team’s ability to conduct an 
overwhelmingly fast-paced amphibious operation that will overpower the enemy before 
they can react and ultimately deter and/or discourage them from fighting. 
The current LHA and LHD class of amphibious assault ships fit into the OMFTS 
objectives because of their versatility and mission objectives which enable response 
throughout the spectrum of conflict from combat to humanitarian operations (Jacob 7). 
Therefore, it is crucial “that naval forces avoid a narrow definition of their capabilities” 
(Operational Maneuver from the Sea 5) and not put restrictions on how the OMFTS 
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capable forces operate. Contrary to this objective, the America class will hinder the 
operational tempo that OMFTS relies on since the ship lacks the capability to conduct 
simultaneous movement of equipment, supplies, vehicles, cargo, and personnel ashore. 
Each phase of movement will take longer because the various helicopters are limited in 
amount of lift capacity (“LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift Comparison” 8–18). This in turn will 
create an undesired operational pause in between phases and defeat the purpose of 
OMFTS altogether. 
2. Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) 
STOM is the tactical implementation of OMFTS that can be applied to all types of 
amphibious operations to overcome access challenges, gain entry, and achieve favorable 
results on land (Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 1). The purpose behind the STOM concept 
is to apply maneuver warfare to amphibious operations at the tactical level to allow the 
Joint Force Commander to directly attain mission objectives (Jacob 9). As with OMFTS, 
STOM focuses on amphibious forces operating across a multitude of different types of 
areas in the uncertain and complex littorals while addressing several different objectives 
with the same general-purpose force (Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 2). The central idea of 
STOM is to “facilitate credible responses to crises in the littorals with tailored, scalable 
forces in permissive, uncertain and hostile environments that will enable successful 
engagements, humanitarian assistance, crisis response, and power projection” (Ship-to-
Objective Maneuver 4). Essentially, STOM is about gaining access to the littorals and 
allowing naval forces to operate in a more decentralized manner to accomplish mission 
objectives directly at a faster rate (Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 4). 
The STOM principles will allow amphibious forces to accomplish a wide variety 
of tasks and goals by exploiting vast improvements in speed, range, and command and 
control along with eliminating the transition at the water’s edge to advocate a seamless 
littoral maneuver. Achieving this goal will require additional advanced unit level training 
that will empower the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to use more 
sophisticated forms of soft and hard power capabilities in the complex littoral 
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environment. The following lists the 11 tenets of STOM and what the amphibious forces 
will be more capable of doing with the implementation of these principles (Ship-to-
Objective Maneuver 4–8): 
 Conduct littoral maneuver while using the sea as a protective barrier and 
highway for logistics and to outflank the enemy. 
 Application of the single-battle concept and treatment of the battlespace as 
an indivisible entity. 
 Improve options for the Joint Force Commander by having a readily 
available force at all times within the operating area. 
 Use of seabasing to limit the footprint ashore and diminish the operational 
pause following troop landing. 
 Focus equally on soft and hard power missions (from combating hostile 
engagements to Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, NEO, and 
humanitarian operations). 
 Emphasis on maneuver flexibility and avoidance of the adversary’s 
established defenses/obstacles. 
 Using a cross-domain approach by treating the littorals collectively as one 
operating domain. 
 Using dispersed forces to avoid negative adversary effects. 
 Employ scalable landing forces. 
 Increase options for partnering with other general purpose forces and other 
government agencies. 
 Gain local area control for required periods of time in order to accomplish 
the mission. 
A wide variety of amphibious assets and platforms are necessary to conduct 
STOM operations and perform littoral maneuver. Aircraft, such as tilt-rotor and heavy-
lift rotor, are a part of the vertical maneuver force that provides longer range/over-the-
horizon landing capabilities of troops and light-weight equipment with excellent speed 
for a faster operational tempo. Landing craft, such as LCACs and LCUs, are a part of the 
surface maneuver force that provide the heavy lift capabilities that bring large quantities 
of supplies and troops over-the-horizon to the beach. The rapid movement of troops 
inland directly to the objective areas will also create an overwhelming fast operational 
tempo that will outpace the adversary’s ability to react, be it an enemy force or Mother 
Nature. The various landing craft also provide a means to seamlessly maneuver over both 
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the sea and land portions of the littorals. Each gives the amphibious force a multitude of 
ways to reach the mission objectives with a scalable amount of combat power and 
aggressiveness (Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 8, 21–22). 
Using both of the vertical and surface force capabilities simultaneously is what 
makes STOM a unique tactic and technique to use in the wide spectrum of operations. 
Amphibious assault ships, such as the LHA, are the central hub of the STOM mission, as 
they provide the launch, recovery, and maintenance platform for both the landing craft 
and aircraft. Other important mission assets that the big deck amphibious assault ships 
bring to the fight are Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
(C4I) systems, logistical support; messing and berthing; full medical facilities; unit and 
staff accommodations; and offensive and defensive weapons suites (Ship-to-Objective 
Maneuver 8, 21–22). As seen with OMFTS, the America class LHAs will also have a 
serious disadvantage with STOM since it uses both vertical and surface forces to 
accomplish missions. America class LHAs will be limited to providing vertical forces 
only. The new amphibious platform also lacks a full medical facility, as it was reduced by 
half to accommodate larger hangar bay space for aircraft maintenance on the MV-22 
Osprey and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (“LHA 6 Information” 5). 
3. OMFTS and STOM Concepts Combined 
The OMFTS and STOM guiding principles in amphibious warfare are what 
Sailors and Marines have trained to and performed over the last several decades. These 
concepts along with a powerful amphibious fleet are the reasons why the United States 
has the most capable amphibious force in the world. In order to demonstrate the 
importance of the well deck and to show that the OMFTS and STOM principles are 
centered on the dual well deck – flight deck capability in amphibious operations, both 
doctrinal concepts were combined and analyzed. Since STOM is the tactical 
implementation of OMFTS, the STOM tenets were mapped back to the more general 




 OMFTS focuses on an operational objective. 
 STOM: Focus equally on soft and hard power missions (from combating 
hostile engagements to Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, NEO, and 
humanitarian operations). 
 STOM: Gain local area control for required periods of time in order to 
accomplish the mission. 
The OMFTS principle of “focusing on an operational objective” is very generic as 
most missions will seek to achieve specific goals and purposes. Accomplishing both soft 
and hard powered combat missions along with NEO and humanitarian operations can be 
achieved without a well deck capability, but with how much ease and at what cost. As 
stated previously and proven by the mission types of LHAs and LHDs from 1979 to 2006 
data, amphibious ships have been given a great deal of combat and humanitarian tasks 
and missions repeatedly because of the versatile assets this force has. The well deck asset 
is heavily relied upon to accomplish these missions. Without it the mission may be 
achieved, but at greater costs to the troops and the effectiveness of the operation. Much 
the same can be stated about the time required to gain local area control to accomplish the 
mission. It may be able to be achieved without a well deck capability, but again at what 
cost to the landing force. 
 OMFTS uses the sea as maneuver space. 
 STOM: Conduct littoral maneuver while using the sea as a protective 
barrier and highway for logistics and to outflank the enemy. 
 STOM: Emphasis on maneuver flexibility and avoidance of the 
adversary’s established defenses/obstacles. 
The OMFTS principle of “using the sea as a maneuver space” is once again vague 
and states the obvious. The Navy and Marine Corps are well accustomed to operating and 
maneuvering on the sea, especially in the littorals. Using the sea as a protective barrier, a 
highway for logistics, and as a means to outflank the enemy clearly indicates the need for 
amphibious landing craft. Aircraft are essential in amphibious operations; however, it is 
using the sea as a maneuver space that is emphasized here. The requirement of landing 
craft in this principle means that a well deck capability is also a necessity. The various 
amphibious landing craft provide the transportation of equipment, supplies, and vehicles 
along the logistical sea highway and provide a flexible means to maneuver troops to 
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outflank the enemy and avoid established defenses and obstacles. In conjunction with 
landing craft, aircraft will also be able to achieve these concepts. Without a well deck 
capability, the amphibious force is limited to air assets only which would result in a 
decrease in both troop flexibility and ability to maneuver to avoid the enemy, especially 
if the adversary has surface-to-air missiles. Therefore, this OMFTS principle and these 
STOM tenets rely heavily on the dual amphibious landing craft and aircraft capability. 
Not having a well deck would defeat the whole purpose of the OMFTS and STOM 
concepts. 
 OMFTS generates overwhelming tempo and momentum. 
 STOM: Use of seabasing to limit the footprint ashore and diminish the 
operational pause following troop landing. 
Generating overwhelming tempo and momentum to keep constant pressure on the 
enemy is essential in defeating any adversary. By limiting the logistical footprint ashore, 
friendly forces limit the exposure of a critical vulnerability to the adversary to disrupt, 
destroy, or exploit. Diminishing the operational pause following troop landing will keep 
the pressure on the enemy and not allow them to regroup or reorganize. It will also add to 
increasing the operational tempo and prevent a shift in momentum towards the enemy. 
The need for a well deck capability is crucial to this principle because without it will limit 
how troops and equipment get to shore. A one sided air assault is not flexible and can be 
predictable. Plus it will cause the undesired operational pause, defeating the entire 
purpose of these two doctrines. Air assets do not have the ability to simultaneously land 
combat ready Marines and heavy equipment due to lift and weight constraints. Well 
decks allow for landing craft to bring heavy equipment, supplies, and vehicles ashore 
while helicopters fly personnel to the beach all at the same time. This cannot be done 
with just air assets. 
 OMFTS pits strengths against weakness. 
 STOM: Emphasis on maneuver flexibility and avoidance of the 
adversary’s established defenses/obstacles. 
 STOM: Employ scalable landing forces. 
Pitting strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses is typically what is expected 
when fighting against an adversary. Of course friendly forces want to put their strength 
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against the enemy’s weakness in order to defeat them with as little damage or death as 
possible to their own force. Avoiding enemy defenses and obstacles relates to pitting 
strengths against weakness since amphibious forces want to steer clear of enemy 
strongholds and maneuver troops to areas that are weaker in order to break down and 
defeat the enemy. Employing a scalable landing force adds strength as more troops 
allows for overpowering the adversary. The need for a well deck once again arises as 
landing craft are required to land the landing force and aid in maneuvering forces to 
avoid enemy defenses. The dual air and sea attack on an enemy force adds to the strength 
of the most capable and powerful amphibious force in the world. Not having a well deck 
in the picture will compel the Navy and Marine Corps to change how they will pit their 
strengths against the weaknesses of the enemy. Conducting amphibious operations only 
with an air asset capability violates time proven amphibious tactics, techniques, 
procedures, and doctrine that the Navy and Marine Corps uses, trains to, and how they 
think and plan for missions. 
 OMFTS emphasizes intelligences, deceptions, and flexibility. 
 STOM: Improve options for the Joint Force Commander by having a 
readily available force at all times within the operating area. 
 STOM: Using dispersed forces to avoid negative adversary effects. 
Intelligence gathering, deceptions, and flexibility are incorporated into any type of 
military operation. Flexibility is the greatest element that the Joint Force Commander can 
be given as amphibious ships provide a variety of assets and means to maneuver troops 
and equipment ashore within the operating area. One of the best ways to occupy or 
distract the enemy is to position a rather large amphibious landing force off their coast, 
whether it is to gather intelligence, see how the enemy reacts, or as a means to deceive, as 
seen in Operation Desert Storm. Either way it gives the Joint Force Commander the 
option to use the available force for whatever he or she sees fit. The amphibious force can 
also provide the Joint Force Commander with additional flexibility to react to any sudden 
enemy movements by employing a large, scalable landing force or dispersing the troops 
to avoid any negative adversarial effects. To do this, a well deck capability is required. 
Amphibious assault ships are flexible because they can perform both aircraft and landing 
craft operations. It allows for the Joint Force Commander to employ the troops in 
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multiple fashions. Amphibious warfare brings many assets and many capabilities to the 
warfighting table. If a major capability, i.e. the well deck, is taken away, then it only 
limits the Joint Force Commander and landing forces’ ability to conduct operations and 
accomplish the mission. 
 OMFTS integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets. 
 STOM: Application of the single-battle concept and treatment of the 
battlespace as an indivisible entity. 
 STOM: Improve options for the Joint Force Commander by having a 
readily available force at all times within the operating area. 
 STOM: Using a cross-domain approach by treating the littorals 
collectively as one operating domain. 
 STOM: Increase options for partnering with other general purpose forces 
and other government agencies. 
Integrating all types of assets is the name of the game in amphibious warfare. The 
Navy and Marine Corps join together with the Army and Air Force in one, indivisible 
battlespace to allow the Joint Force Commander the ability to conduct joint operations 
with a valuable set of assets. The theme in each of these four STOM tenets is operating 
jointly in a single battlespace domain. The single battlespace domain happens to be the 
littorals which signal the need for an amphibious landing force and of course a well deck 
capability. Combining the simultaneous use of the well deck and flight deck assets is 
what makes the United States amphibious capability the most dominate and unique in the 
world. If the well deck asset is taken away, it makes achieving the mission objectives a 
much more difficult task. 
The OMFTS and STOM principles and concepts are centered on the Navy and 
Marine Corps’ ability to conduct landing craft and aircraft operations on board 
amphibious assault ships. Eliminating the well deck will negatively impact how the Navy 
and Marine Corps conduct amphibious operations and add significantly more challenges 
to landing troops ashore. As seen through this analysis of the OMFTS and STOM 
principles, the well deck capability is not only heavily relied upon to complete 
amphibious raids and assault, but to conduct humanitarian aid and disaster relief 
operations as well. If drastic changes are made to current Navy and Marine Corps 
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amphibious capabilities, then the doctrine used to guide the planning and execution of 
operations and missions must be given a chance to address and reflect upon these 
limitations. 
4. Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Joint Publication 3-02) 
OMFTS and STOM may set forth the higher level principles for amphibious 
warfare, but it is Joint Publication 3-02 that provides the guiding principles for the 
military to conduct amphibious operations. As with most joint doctrine, general concepts 
and descriptions are outlined and discussed to establish a baseline of terminology for 
each of the armed services to commonly use and understand. 
The concept of amphibious operations involves launching a landing force 
embarked on ships or craft by sea in order to accomplish assigned missions ashore. The 
five types of amphibious operations consist of demonstrations, raids, assaults, 
withdrawals, and other operations in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. An 
amphibious demonstration is a show of force meant to deceive the enemy in order to try 
and force them into an unfavorable course of action (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious 
Operations I-2). The different between an amphibious raid and assault is that a raid is a 
quick incursion or temporary occupation of an objective area followed by a planned 
withdrawal (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations I-3). An assault is a lengthier 
process and involves the establishment of a landing force on a hostile shore in which they 
will occupy for a greater amount of time than a raid. An amphibious withdrawal is “the 
extraction of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore 
(Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations I-2).”  Other amphibious operations involve 
humanitarian aid and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, and various 
other military operations other than war (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations I-3). 
The two forces that combine to accomplish these operations are the amphibious task 
force (ATF) and the landing force (LF). The ATF is the naval component formed to 
conduct amphibious operations and is commanded by a senior Navy officer (Commander 
Amphibious Task Force, CATF). The LF is the Marine Corps or Army component of the 
amphibious operation and is commanded by a senior Marine or Army officer 
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(Commander Landing Force, CLF). Each force will be the supported and supporting 
component during different phases of the operation (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious 
Operations I-1). The supported commander receives assistance from another 
commander’s force or capabilities and is responsible for ensuring that the supporting 
commander comprehends the assistance required (Joint Publication 1-02: Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 327). The supporting commander 
aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force and is responsible for 
providing assistance required by the supported commander (Joint Publication 1-02: 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 328).   For example, 
during amphibious assault operations, the captain of the ship is the supporting 
commander while the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) colonel is the supported 
commander. The captain and crew of the LHA or LHD will provide assistance and 
support while the Marines are offloaded ashore. The roles become reversed during 
operations and missions out to sea as the MEU colonel supports the captain of the ship, 
supplying extra defensive capabilities and personnel. 
The underlying theme in amphibious operations continues to be the application of 
expeditionary maneuver principles, which are similarly described in the OMFTS and 
STOM doctrine. The goal of maneuver is to match strength against the enemy’s weakness 
by using overwhelming speed and power to gain a temporal advantage. The most 
important capability, however, is having the means to conduct amphibious operations 
from over the horizon beyond visual sight of the coastline in order to conceal the force 
and extend them away from enemy line of fire and radar range (Joint Doctrine for 
Amphibious Operations I-6). Amphibious operations are an effective tool for the Joint 
Force Commander (JFC) to utilize because they exploit the adversary’s weaknesses and 
apply a constant amount of combat power to accomplish the mission promptly by 
achieving campaign objectives in one swift stroke (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious 
Operations I-1, I-3). Amphibious forces also provide rapid deployable, adaptable, and 
versatile war-fighting capabilities to the JFC as they can accomplish such a wide variety 
of missions in all various types of weather and emission control (EMCON) environments. 
EMCON is the selective and controlled use of electromagnetic and/or acoustic emitters to 
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optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing detection by enemy sensors 
and avoiding friendly interference (Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 328). 
Amphibious operations require a flexible command and control system in order 
for the appropriate commanders to make quick decisions to maintain a high tempo of 
operations. Command and control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission” (Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms 61).  The C4I systems and equipment must support this type of 
command and control structure and all its functional areas, which include fires, aviation, 
intelligence, combat service support, etc. (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations VI-
1). A C4I Systems Support Plan is prepared in detail that depicts all aspects of 
communications circuits and channels, radio and weapons guidance, call signs, 
frequencies, cryptographic and authentication systems, and policies and procedures to 
govern the operation and coordination of the overall system (Joint Doctrine for 
Amphibious Operations VI-4). The following is a list of the eight basic items a C4I 
Support Plan requires (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations VI-5): 
 General coverage of the communications situation and the concept of 
operation communications employment. 
 Announcement of the communications mission. 
 Delegation of tasks and responsibilities to major elements of the force. 
 Detailed instructions for organization, installation, operation, coordination, 
and maintenance of the communications system. 
 Assignment and employment of call signs, frequencies, cryptographic 
aids, and authentication systems. 
 Instructions on countermeasures, operations security, military deception, 
and communications security. 
 Interoperability of all required communications systems. 
 Logistic support for communications and electronics. 
Another important aspect of the command and control system of amphibious 
operations is the five planning phases: Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, and 
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Action. Planning begins when a warning or operation order is given to the task force and 
notionally ends at the start of the embarkation phase. Planning is, however, continuous 
throughout the operation but changes hands between the amphibious force commanders 
as the operational phase begins. During the Embarkation phase, the landing force along 
with its equipment, vehicles and supplies embark on various amphibious assault ships. A 
great deal of flexibility and ingenuity is involved in this phase to account for any changes 
to the original plan that may require reconfiguring the embarked forces. The Rehearsal 
phase is the period in which the landing force tests the adequacy and feasibility of the 
plan by either performing an actual landing and/or conducting a command post exercise. 
Rehearsing the plan allows all echelons involved to become familiar with the flow of 
operations and provides an opportunity to reconfigure forces if necessary. During the 
Movement phase, the amphibious forces deploy from the port of embarkation to the 
forward operating area. This phase is completed when all elements of the amphibious 
force arrive at their assigned positions in the operational area. The Action phase is the 
decisive amphibious landing of troops, supplies, and equipment from the ships to the 
beach and other objective areas and terminates following the accomplishment of the 
mission (Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations I-7). 
5. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy 
The National Security and Military Strategies set forth guidance and vision for the 
United States Armed Forces and allude to the focus of future operations and missions. 
The current strategic American interests include the security of the United States, its 
citizens and allies, a strong economy that promotes opportunity and prosperity, respect 
for values all over the world, and an international order that promotes peace and security 
through cooperation to meet global challenges (National Security Strategy 7). From a 
military perspective, keeping the United States and the American people safe and secure 
begins with a strong defense at home and abroad. It is therefore necessary and essential 
that the Armed Forces have a substantial amount of leadership, training, and equipment 
required to accomplish the mission (National Security Strategy 22) and not limit or cut 
any critical capabilities that the services rely on to fight. 
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A key theme in both the National Security and Military Strategies is to “prepare 
for increasingly sophisticated adversaries, deterring and defeating aggression in anti-
access environments” (Work 6).  Anti-access environments, in a Navy and Marine Corps 
sense, are those areas in the littorals in which the only way in is by forceful entrance by 
sea. Winning the access battle as new challenges emerge is vital to the U.S. foreign 
policy, alliances, and global interests to project power and promote worldwide security 
(Work 7–8). This is exactly why the United States Navy and Marine Corps retains an 
amphibious assault capability. Gaining access to areas of interest, particularly in the 
littorals, is precisely what an amphibious force can achieve. 
Established from the National Security Strategy, the National Military Objectives 
include countering violent extremism, deterring and defeating aggression, strengthening 
international and regional security, and shaping the future force (The National Military 
Strategy of the United States of America 4). The Navy and Marine Corps team plays a 
role in each of these objectives, especially in projection of power as they are the most 
mobile and flexible force in the world. While unconventional warfare has become more 
common over the past decade, maintenance of a robust conventional deterrent is required 
to discourage the enemy and defeat aggression. Deterrence also “requires the ability to 
rapidly and globally project power in all domains,” which the Navy and Marine Corps 
excel in, train to, and practice through proven doctrinal concepts (The National Military 
Strategy of the United States of America 8). Preserving the forward presence of the U.S. 
along with safeguarding access to bases, ports, and airfields around the world adds to 
strengthening international and regional security (The National Military Strategy of the 
United States of America 10). Humanitarian aid and assistance operations also fit into this 
objective, especially after natural disasters where chaos and insecurity can ensue. As 
mentioned earlier, because of their versatility and available resources, amphibious assault 
ships and forces have successfully taken on an increased roll of humanitarian operations 
as they are able to reach inaccessible areas. Shaping the future maritime force involves a 
mix of both small and large multi-mission capable platforms that provide the ability to 
conduct the full range of naval operations across all domains (The National Military 
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Strategy of the United States of America 19). Amphibious assault ships fit this profile as 
they are the larger units that can perform a multitude of missions globally through all 
operational environments. 
C. CURRENT LHA LIFT CAPABILITIES AND CONFIGURATIONS 
In conjunction with the establishment of written doctrine and key concepts, the 
second major component in the development of amphibious warfare tactics was the 
construction of specialized warships. The first ship designed from the keel up to support 
amphibious operations was the Amphibious Assault Ship (Helicopter), or LPH class, in 
the 1950s (“LPH-2 IWO JIMA Class: Overview”). The LHA Tarawa class ships 
followed in the 1970s and the LHD Wasp class in the 1980s as the first amphibious 
assault ships with a well deck. For the purpose of this thesis, the lift capabilities and 
configurations of the Tarawa class LHAs will be explored in detail in order to compare it 
with the replacement America class LHAs of the future. 
1. LHA Tarawa Class 
The Tarawa class LHAs were constructed by Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, 
Mississippi starting in the late 1970s. The maximum speed of LHAs is 24 knots with a 
maximum range of 10,000 nautical miles at a more sustainable 20 knots (“LHA-1 Tarawa 
Class”). Tarawa class LHAs have a crew of about 1,000 naval personnel and have the 
ability to embark roughly 2,000 Marines (“United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious 
Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). 
The Tarawa class LHAs were designed and built for both fixed and rotary wing 
aircraft operations along with simultaneous wet well deck operations. The maximum 
aircraft configuration on the LHA is as follows: 12 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters, four 
CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters, three UH-1N Huey helicopters, four AH-1W Super 
Cobra helicopters, and six AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft (“United States Navy Fact File: 
Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). While this is the typical aviation load-
out for a Tarawa class LHA, number and type of aircraft will vary depending on the 
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mission and tasking for the particular Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)/Amphibious 
Ready Group (ARG). This typical aviation load-out will also be used as the standard 
throughout this thesis. 
The LHA well deck design allows for two typical configurations due to a divider 
down the center of the well: four LCUs (split two and two, one behind the other) or two 
LCUs and one LCAC (LCUs forward, one on either side of the divider with the LCAC at 
the stern). Figure 2 is an image of the USS Tarawa’s well deck, showing the divider 
down the right side of the photo. AAVs can also be launched and recovered from the 
LHA, however, no other craft can be in the well deck at the same time (“United States 
Navy Fact File: Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). These landing craft 
configurations will be used as the standard throughout this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 2.   LHA Well Deck (From “LCAC departs the well deck  
of USS Tarawa [LHA 1]”). 
The five categories or footprints of amphibious lift are 1) the number of troops 
each ship can carry, 2) square footage of the vehicle storage area, 3) cubic footage of the 
cargo storage area, 4) the number of helicopter parking spots, and 5) the number of 
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LCAC landing spots (A CBO Study: The Future of the Navy’s Amphibious and Maritime 
Prepositioning Forces 4). As mentioned earlier, LHAs can embark up to 2,000 Marines 
and have one LCAC spot in the well deck. The vehicle storage area of the LHA is 25,400 
square feet while the cargo storage area is 105,900 cubic feet. The number of helicopter 
spots, expressed as CH-46 equivalents, is 42 (A CBO Study: The Future of the Navy’s 
Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces 4). 
2. Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) 
LCACs are the high speed, over-the-horizon, ship-to shore transporter for Marines 
along with their equipment, weapons and cargo. Developed and built by Textron Marine 
and Land Systems, LCACs began their life cycle in the Navy in the early 1980s. LCACs 
can maintain a 40 to 50 knot speed over water with a full load and have a range of 200 
nautical miles at 40 knots and 300 nautical miles at 35 knots with a payload (“United 
States Navy Fact File: Landing Craft, Air Cushioned”). 
The LCAC is a unique landing craft for the Navy and Marine Corps to use and 
operate as it can reach more than seventy percent of the world’s coastline due to its air 
cushion technology that allows the craft to glide or fly across the water and beaches. This 
significantly increases the ability of the Marine Ground Combat Element to land on just 
about any beach in the world (“United States Navy Fact File: Landing Craft, Air 
Cushioned”). LCACs are capable of carrying up to 60 to 75 tons, including all vehicles in 
a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), large equipment containers, rough terrain cargo 
handlers, and any palletized loads (DuBose). Examples of MEB equipment, weapons and 
supplies include M1A1 tanks, 155mm Howitzers, 81 and 60mm Mortars, anti-tank 
missile launchers, Javelins, 50-caliber machine guns, stinger missiles, HMMWVs, light 
armored vehicles, 7-ton trucks, dump trucks, logistics vehicle systems, refuelers, dozers, 
and cranes (“United States Marine Corps”). The LCAC can also be used to transport 
troops ashore in either cabin seating, totally 24 available seats, or by a marine carrier 
transport, which seats 150 troops (“Landing Craft, Air Cushioned – LCAC). The cargo 
deck area is 1,809 square feet and is 27 feet wide. The bow ramp is also 27 feet wide 
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while the stern ramp is narrower at 15 feet (DuBose). The limits to LCACs are therefore 
weight and area along with sea state, as they cannot operate in a sea state greater than 
three. 
3. Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 
Like LCACs, LCUs are used by amphibious forces to transport Marines and their 
equipment, weapons, and supplies ashore. While a much older design dating back to 
World War II, LCUs still remain as the backbone of heavy amphibious lifts. The three 
current active classes in the Navy, LCU 1610, 1627 and 1646, were built throughout the 
1970s by various shipbuilders in the United States. LCUs have the ability to carry a 
heavier load than LCACs; however, the trade-off for carrying capacity is speed as the 
LCU can only reach a maximum of 11 knots. LCUs have a range of 1,200 nautical miles 
at a sustained eight knots and have the ability to operate out to sea for up to ten days 
(“United States Navy Fact File: Landing Craft, Mechanized and Utility (LCM/LCU)”). 
LCUs have both a bow and stern ramp, similar to the LCAC, for on-load and off-
load of the various equipment, vehicles, weapons, and supplies from ship to shore. The 
cargo deck area measures 1,785 square feet and each ramp is the same width of the LCU, 
29 feet (“Landing Craft Utility (LCU)”). The maximum lift LCUs can carry is up to 170 
tons or over twice what LCACs can carry. LCUs can also carry all vehicles in the MEB, 
including three M1A1 tanks and ten light armored vehicles at once, transport 400 plus 
troops, or 125 tons of cargo. As with LCACs, LCUs can have a variety of load 
configurations due to the various amounts of equipment and vehicles and nature of the 
mission. The limitations of LCUs are the same as LCACs, but also have a disadvantage 
when it comes to speed. Like the LCAC, LCUs cannot operate in a sea state greater than 
three (“United States Navy Fact File: Landing Craft, Mechanized and Utility 
(LCM/LCU)”). 
4. Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) 
AAVs are armored assault full-tracked landing vehicles that carry Marines and 
cargo ashore during amphibious operations (“AAV-7 Amphibious Assault Vehicle”). 
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Designed and manufactured by the FMC Corporation in the early 1970s, AAVs sustain 
the primary means of armored protected mobility for the Marine Ground Combat 
Element. It remains in service as the unique sea and land personnel carrier with the 
capability to land troops ashore in hostile environments (“PM AAVS Program Brief” 3). 
AAVs have a cruising speed through the water of five knots with a maximum speed of 
seven knots. The range of the AAV in the water is seven hours at five knots and on land 
is 300 miles at 21 knots (“LVTP7 Landing Vehicle, Tracked AAVP7A1 Assault 
Amphibian Vehicle Personnel”). 
The primary mission of AAVs is to spearhead the beach during an amphibious 
assault. Once disembarked from the ship, AAVs go ashore carrying infantry and supplies 
to provide a forced entry into the amphibious assault area and establish a position for the 
surface assault echelon (“LVTP7 Landing Vehicle, Tracked AAVP7A1 Assault 
Amphibian Vehicle Personnel”). AAVs can carry up to 21 combat-equipped Marines or 
10,000 pounds of cargo (“AAV-7 Amphibious Assault Vehicle”). These two typical 
configurations will be used as the AAV standard throughout this thesis. The limits of 
AAVs are again similar to LCACs and LCUs, but are more restrictive when it comes to 
speed, sea state, and distance to land. AAVs are much slower through the water, require 
closer launches to land, and cannot operate in sea states greater than two. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced amphibious assault ships, their history, doctrine, and 
current configurations that are being utilized by the Navy and Marine Corps. The Pacific 
theater in World War II had a major influence of how today’s U.S. amphibious operations 
are planned and executed. The development and design of ships, landing craft, and 
aircraft over the past several decades have been tailored to the doctrine and training of the 
Navy and Marine Corps. Maintaining a complex, two-tiered amphibious assault 
capability has proven crucial as LHA and LHD ESG/ARGs are continually tasked with a 
variety of missions. The future of the amphibious fleet and a shift in design will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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The LHA Tarawa class model will be used throughout this thesis. However, the 
LHD Wasp class model may be substituted and used subsequently with minor changes to 
the configuration and lift capabilities. Both the current LHA and LHD classes have the 
ability to carry LCACs, LCUs and AAVs along with all aircraft from the Marine Air 
Combat Element. 
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III. CHANGE IN SHIPBOARD AMPHIBIOUS DESIGN 
A. OVERVIEW 
The current LHA amphibious design model centers on the Navy and Marine 
Corps’ ability to conduct landing operations by sea and air. LHA Tarawa class 
amphibious ships can conduct landing craft and aircraft operations simultaneously, 
allowing for a two-pronged approach in the desired amphibious objective area. The future 
LHA (R) design model will dramatically shift how amphibious operations are conducted. 
With the elimination of the well deck in the America class amphibious ships, this new 
design will focus solely on aviation assets to land Marines ashore. 
This chapter will look at the new amphibious assault ship design and describe its 
expected capabilities and load configurations. It will discuss the design decision process 
and how it was applied to creating this new LHA (R) amphibious model. Lastly, this 
chapter will look at previous design models in order to determine best practices and 
lessons learned with regards to developing a suitable recommended model for the Navy 
and Marine Corps to utilize. 
1. LHA (R) America Class Layout and Design 
The first of the three ships procured in the LHA (R) America class is currently 
being constructed in Pascagoula, Mississippi by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (“PEO 
Ships Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA 6): Program Summary”). The Pre-Commissioned 
Unit (PCU) America, LHA 6, is scheduled for delivery to the U.S. fleet in 2013 with a 
2014 commissioning date. Modeled after the USS Makin Island LHD 8 design, the LHA 
(R) America class will also be a gas turbine-electric ship (“United States Navy Fact File: 
Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). The maximum speed of the new LHA 
will be 22 knots with an expected maximum range similar to the Tarawa class at 10,000 
nautical miles. The crew will consist of 1,204 personnel with the ability to embark up to 
1,871 landing force troops. The remaining amphibious lift footprints will be as follows: 
the vehicle stowage area is 10,328 square feet; the cargo stowage area is 160,000 cubic 
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feet; number of helicopter spots expressed as CH-46 equivalents is 45; and number of 
LCAC spots is zero (“LHA 6 Information” 4–6). 
The America class cannot support any landing craft (LCACs, LCUs, and AAVs) 
due to the elimination of the well deck and therefore does not have a surface load 
configuration. Like that of the Tarawa class, America class amphibious ships will have 
the ability to conduct both rotary and fixed wing aircraft operations, primarily flying the 
MV-22 Osprey and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The CH-53E Sea Stallion, UH-1Y Huey, 
AH-1Z Super Cobra, and MH-60S helicopters will also be able to embark onboard; 
however, will be limited due to the focus on the newer Osprey and Joint Strike Fighter 
aircraft. The two typical planned aviation load-out configurations for the LHA (R) will be 
a Combined Load for maximum use of the Osprey and Joint Strike Fighter and a Notional 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Mix. The Combined Load will consist of 12 MV-22 
Ospreys, 12 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and two MH-60Ss for search and rescue. The 
Notional MEU Mix will consist of 12 MV-22 Ospreys, six F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, 
seven AH-1/UH-1 Huey and Super Cobras mixed, four CH-53E Sea Stallions, and two 
MH-60Ss for search and rescue (“LHA 6 Information” 4). As with the Tarawa class, 
these are the typical aviation load-outs for the America class and are subject to change 
depending on the mission and tasking assigned. These two load-outs will be used as the 
standard throughout this thesis. 
The biggest design difference between the Tarawa and America classes is the 
decision to eliminate the well deck to provide additional space for supporting aviation 
elements. The extra area gained went to extending the hangar bay in length and added 
several feet in height in order to support maintenance and service to the MV-22 Osprey 
(“USS America (LHA 6): A Different Kind of Gator”). Ballast tanks, used to flood the 
well deck, were converted to carry extra jet propulsion fuel, JP-5, thereby increasing the 
amount of aviation fuel to 1.3 million gallons. The remaining space allowed for more 
aviation storage and maintenance shops to support embarked aircraft. Medical facilities 
were also reduced down from four to two operating rooms and from 48 to 24 hospital 
ward beds to support the need for more aviation required space (“LHA 6 Information” 4–
6). 
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2. MV-22 Osprey 
The MV-22 Osprey is the Marine Corps’ version of this tilt-rotor aircraft that 
combines the speed and range of an airplane with that of the vertical flight capabilities of 
a helicopter (“MV-22 Osprey: Speed, Range and Vertical Flight”). The Osprey was 
designed for expeditionary assault, raid operations and cargo lift (“MV-22 Osprey: 
Speed, Range and Vertical Flight”) but can also perform other secondary missions which 
include search and rescue and special operations (Bolkcom Summary). The V-22 
program began in the early 1980s by the Department of Defense and continued to grow 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s as a joint service project with the Marine Corps as 
the lead service in the development of the aircraft (Bolkcom Summary and “United States 
Navy Fact File: V-22A Osprey tilt rotor aircraft”). While the program remains in a 
somewhat controversial stage due to issues surrounding testing accidents, maintenance, 
and cost, the Osprey is still scheduled to become the Marine Corps’ aircraft of the future 
(Bolkcom CRS-2). Currently, the Marine Corps is planning to purchase 360 Ospreys 
while the Navy is scheduled to buy 48 over the next decade (“United States Navy Fact 
File: V-22A Osprey tilt rotor aircraft”). 
Built by Bell-Boeing, the MV-22 performs vertical take-offs and landings with 
the rotor blades in the upright position, similar to that of a normal helicopter. Once stable 
in the air, the blades rotate down like a jet propeller plane, having a maximum cruising 
speed of 241 to 257 knots depending on ceiling limitations. The range of the aircraft 
varies with mission and fuel capacity. The mission radius with the aft sponson fuel tank 
for land-assault troop missions is 242 nautical miles while for a pre-assault raid is 267 
nautical miles. The mission radius with full wing fuel tanks for land-assault troop 
missions is 233 nautical miles while for a pre-assault raid is 306 nautical miles. Land-
assault troop missions are performed during amphibious assaults in which the aircraft 
would be carrying the maximum capacity of 24 combat-ready Marines. Pre-assault raids 
occur prior to major amphibious operations to prepare the battle space, perform 
reconnaissance, and collect intelligence. The load in the aircraft is less during pre-assault 
raid operations and therefore has a greater range during those missions. Its single cargo 
hook can lift 10,000 pounds, or the equivalent of one Howitzer, and its dual hook can lift 
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15,000 pounds (“V22 Characteristics”). The expected maximum amount of MV-22 
Ospreys to embark on board the LHA (R) class is 12 (“LHA 6 Information” 4). 
3. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will be the next generation strike aircraft 
weapon system for the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, replacing the F/A-18 Hornet, 
AV-8B Harrier, and F/A-22 Raptor from each of the respective services (“Program 
Overview: Program”). The aircraft is currently being developed, tested, and produced in 
three different variants for each service by Lockheed Martin (“Introduction: F-35”). The 
Marine Corps’ variant, F-35B, will have the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) 
capability like that of the aging AV-8B Harrier. The STOVL capability is necessary in 
order to embark on board amphibious assault ships since they do not have a catapult or 
arrest wire system to launch and recover aircraft (“Background: F-35”). The Marine 
Corps intends to purchase 680 F-35Bs over the next ten years, however, the number may 
be reduced due to cost and decreased future Congressional funding (Gertler 7). 
Like the MV-22 Osprey, the F-35 JSF will dominate the flight deck of the LHA 
(R) America class amphibious assault ships. The JSF will be larger and heavier than its 
Harrier predecessor with a length, height and wingspan of 51.2 feet, 14.3 feet, and 35 
feet, respectively. The aircraft’s weight empty is 15,000 pounds with a maximum weight 
of 60,000 pounds (“F-35B Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing Variant”) compared to the 
Harrier’s weight empty at 14,000 pounds and maximum weight of 31,000 pounds (“AV-
8B Harrier: Overview”).   The maximum speed of the JSF is 1.6 mach with combat radius 
listed as greater than 450 nautical miles and maximum range listed at greater than 900 
nautical miles (actual numbers are classified). The weapons payload of the aircraft is 
15,000 pounds with a standard load-out of two air to air missiles and two 1,000 pound 
guided bombs (“F-35B STOVL Variant: F-35 Lightning II.”). Used only as a JSF 
platform, the LHA (R) will be able to carry a maximum of 22 aircraft on board (“LHA 6 
Information” 4). Since this aircraft is purely a strike fighter, it does not have any lift 
capabilities and will be used only as a strike asset during amphibious assaults and raids. 
While the JSF will be a lethal and useful aircraft during amphibious operations, growing 
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concerns have risen surrounding the lift phases of the campaign. As the number of F-35s 
on board the new LHAs increase, it reduces the amount of available helicopter lift assets 
necessary to support the off-load of Marines along with their equipment, supplies, cargo, 
and vehicles since there is not a landing craft capability to perform this function. This 
issue will be explored further in Chapter IV. 
B. DESIGN DECISIONS 
The process to determine the best design models for the U.S. military is quite 
complex and involves a number of different parties with competing interests. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) has adopted an acquisition policy that steps through each 
phase of the complex process to develop the military’s needs and wants into physical 
capabilities. It is in this acquisitions process where design decisions are made and then 
turned into reality with the construction of the project. The intent of the acquisition 
process is to pursue solutions for gaps in military capabilities based on requirements and 
performance. All too often, however, politics, money, and personal agendas get in the 
way of this process and can cause it to run astray from its intended purpose. 
While the DoD’s acquisition policy sets forth specific guidelines and 
requirements to follow, it is an overall generic scheme that can be tailored to each 
specific project and program. For example, ship design and development in general 
follows a very different timeline than an aircraft would because it is a single, major 
construction project and not one of mass production. In order to determine the nature of 
the design decisions made with the America class LHAs, the acquisitions process will be 
examined and compared to how it was applied to the development of the new class of 
amphibious assault ships. 
1. The Acquisition Life Cycle 
The acquisition management system, or acquisition life cycle as it is commonly 
referred to in the DoD, is a generic model for obtaining defense systems. As seen in 
Figure 3, the life-cycle process has several phases that are separated by milestones, or 
decision points (Brown 41). Each project has a program manager who is responsible for 
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accomplishing objectives for the development, production, and sustainment to meet the 
user’s operational needs in defense acquisition (Brown B-147). The program manager 
uses the milestones and decision points in the life cycle as a framework with which to 
review his/her specific program, monitor and administer progress, identify potential 
problems early, and make any necessary corrections (Brown 41–42). The program 
manager reports to the milestone decision authority who is a designated individual that 
has overall responsibility for the program and has the authority to approve entry of the 
program into the next phase of the acquisition process. The milestone decision authority 
is also held accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to Congress 
(Rendon and Snider 10–13). 
 
Figure 3.   Defense Acquisition Management System (From “Enclosure 2–1.  
Defense Acquisition Management System”). 
The acquisition life cycle process begins when a military need exists and current 
capabilities are unable to satisfy the new condition. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) together identify, 
assess, and prioritize joint military capabilities to accomplish missions (Brown 42). The 
JROC is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members include 
each vice chair of all of the armed services. The purpose of the JROC is to lead the Joint 
Staff in developing policies and procedures that determine and validate warfighting 
capability needs (Brown 30). The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) assist the CJCS and JROC in implementing the requirements process. The 
JCIDS process involves analyzing doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, 
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education, personnel, and facilities to define gaps in warfighting capabilities and propose 
solutions to close these gaps (“1.3. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS)”). During this process, technological opportunities and resources are 
explored as well in DoD laboratories and research centers in order provide an initial 
assessment of the feasible technology that is available to solve the needs requirements 
(“1.3. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)”). 
Design decisions start to materialize following the JCIDS process as the program 
formally enters into the acquisition process beginning with the Materiel Solution 
Analysis Phase. During this phase a Materiel Development Decision is made when the 
Joint Staff presents the JROC’s recommendations and the Initial Capabilities Document 
is completed (Brown 43–44). The Initial Capabilities Document presents the definition of 
the capabilities need and describes where it fits in the broader concepts and architectures 
(Brown 34–35). A key concept in this phase is the development of an analysis of 
alternatives study to develop feasible strategies that will meet the required needs listed in 
the Initial Capabilities Document. This analysis is important since it will determine which 
design route is chosen for the project to be manufactured (Brown 44). 
Once the analysis of alternatives is complete and the capability need is identified 
and certified to fulfill the needs set forth in the Initial Capabilities Document, the 
program comes to its first decision point, Milestone A. The milestone decision authority 
for the program formally approves the materiel solution and technology development 
strategy at Milestone A and develops a cost estimate and resource availability strategy. 
The Technology Development Phase begins after the Milestone A decision. The purpose 
of this phase is to reduce technology risk by determining a set of feasible technologies to 
be integrated into the system by completing a preliminary design (Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System 16). After a preliminary design is completed, the decision to 
continue on and initiate the program is made at Milestone B. The milestone decision 
authority must confirm that the technology is mature enough for systems level 
development to begin, that funds are acquired in the budget to carry out the acquisition 
strategy, and receive congressional certification that the program has a high likelihood of 
accomplishing its intended mission (Brown 45). 
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The Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase is what brings the design 
decisions of a program to life. During this phase the design of the system is fully 
developed in an affordable and executable manner. System engineers are guided by key 
performance parameters, or critical user requirements, to create and develop the technical 
activities associated with the project. Program goals for cost, schedule, and performance 
are generated that will describe the program over its life cycle. A series of designs and 
prototyping also occur during this phase to ensure the system meets approved 
requirements and that it has the ability to be reproduced (Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System 19–21). 
At Milestone C, the milestone decision authority will make the decision to 
commit the DoD to production of the desired system. The Production and Deployment 
Phase marks the start of construction of the system to achieve operational capability and 
satisfy mission needs. The system will be produced, operationally tested, and then turned 
over to the appropriate service for use and deployment (Brown 47). The last phase of the 
acquisition life cycle is sustainment of the system in which full operational capability is 
achieved and logistical support is maintained. The life cycle ends with the final disposal 
of the system once its lifespan ends (Brown 48). 
2. U.S. Navy Ship Acquisition Process 
The Defense Acquisition Management System is a generic process used for the 
acquirement of various defense systems. The U.S. Navy, through the Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA), has tailored this process towards shipbuilding and design. 
NAVSEA is the Navy’s largest system command that engineers, builds, buys, and 
maintains ships, submarines, and combat systems in order to meet the current and future 
operational requirements of the fleet (“About NAVSEA”). While the general process 
remains the same, the shipbuilding acquisition life cycle has several specific deviations 
throughout the course of each program. 
The shipbuilding acquisition life cycle starts out the same with the generation of 
needs and capabilities requirements through the JCIDS process. An analysis of 
alternatives and feasibility studies are still conducted during the Materiel Solution 
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Analysis Phase prior to the Milestone A decision. It is at Milestone A where the 
shipbuilding process changes as program initiation is approved here instead of at 
Milestone B. The Technology Development Phase is centered on the creation of the ship 
design and is the vital step in the process where design decisions are made. Figure 4 
depicts the shipbuilding acquisition strategy through Milestone A. Designs are either 
modified and repeated or are redesigned new. The type of design will determine how 
contracts will be awarded; either competitive among companies or sole source ownership 
(“Surface Ship Design” 3). 
 
 
Figure 4.   Shipbuilding Acquisition Strategy (From “Surface Ship Design” 4). 
Between Milestones A and B, there are three distinct design phases: 1) Concept 
Design, 2) Preliminary Design, and 3) Contract Design. During the Concept Design 
Phase, industry teams develop a ship concept that responds to the Initial Capabilities 
Document requirements and offer trade-offs of major military requirements against ship 
size and cost. The Navy will simultaneously assess for technical feasibility and identify 
major risks for the proposed concepts. The Concept Design Phase will typically last from 
three to twelve months (“Surface Ship Design” 14). The purpose of the Preliminary 
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Design Phase is to fully define the ship characteristics and cost in a functional baseline 
for the ship alternative that was selected. The requirements flow-down process begins 
during this phase as the industry develops a Functional Baseline Design that conforms to 
the required standards. The major components of the ship are selected, including the hull 
form and new enabling technologies. The roles of the Navy during this phase are to 
review and approve the industry’s Functional Baseline Design before moving on to more 
detailed plans. The Preliminary Design Phase will typically last from 12 to 15 months 
(“Surface Ship Design” 15). During the Contract Design Phase, the ship design is further 
developed and optimized to support the ship procurement package and refined cost 
estimate. The industry conducts performance and further detailed-oriented trade-off 
studies while developing an Allocated Baseline Design, in which the Navy must approve 
before a Milestone B decision is made (“Surface Ship Design” 16). The Allocated 
Baseline Design depicts the configuration items that make up the ship and how each is 
intended to function all together (“Establishment of Configuration Baselines”). The 
Contract Design Phase will typically last from 15 to 24 months (“Surface Ship Design” 
16). 
Following the approval of Milestone B, where the lead ship of the class will be 
approved and named, the Detail Design and Construction Phase will began. The purpose 
of this phase is to fully articulate the design in terms of product models, purchase 
specifications, construction drawing, and process instructions. The industry conducts a 
final detail design review in parallel with procurement of materials and components. 
Construction begins on the ship, which is surveyed throughout this phase by the Navy 
(“Surface Ship Design” 17). The Detail Design and Construction Phase will typically last 
for several years, depending on the size and technical aspects of the ship. 
Another deviation from the original DoD acquisition process seen in shipbuilding 
is the absence of Milestone C. Once construction is complete, the ship is christened and 
launched into the water for the first time. Sea trials are then conducted to test and 
demonstrate the satisfactory operation of all installed shipboard equipment and ensure the 
ship performs in accordance with its plans and specifications. Once all tests are complete 
and satisfy the Navy, the ship is officially delivered to the fleet and sailed away from the 
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shipyard. This marks the start of the Operations and Support Phase of the ship’s life cycle 
as construction ends and naval operations begin (“Shipbuilding 101: Milestones”). 
3. America Class LHA Development and Production 
The LHA Replacement Program began its journey through the acquisition process 
much the same as any other program with a desired need. The Tarawa class LHAs began 
reaching the end of their life cycle in the early 2000s and the Navy needed a replacement 
amphibious assault ship to take their place on the high seas. With a capability need in 
mind, several studies were conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses, including a LHA 
Development of Options Study in 1999, Mission Area Analysis in 2000, and an Analysis 
of Alternatives that was completed in 2002 (Sullivan 16). It is interesting to note that the 
LHA (R) Milestone A was approved in July 2001 prior to the Analysis of Alternatives 
completion in 2002, which signified program initiation. This deviates from the notional 
shipbuilding process as these events usually occur in the reverse order (“Schedule for 
LHA 6 AMERICA CLASS”). While several of these documents are limited in their 
distribution, the Navy decided not to use any of the newly proposed designs for the 
replacement LHAs and instead went with a repeat modified design of the gas turbine-
electric hybrid LHD 8 model. 
Table 7 shows the schedule for LHA 6, the first ship in the LHA (R) class. Each 
milestone is listed with an objective and threshold date. The objective date is the optimal 
goal to begin each milestone while the threshold date is the last possible time to begin the 
milestone in order to finish the project on schedule. The Estimate/Actual date lists when 







Table 7.   LHA 6 Schedule (After “Schedule for LHA 6 AMERICA CLASS”). 
LHA 6 Milestone Schedule 
Milestones Objective Threshold Actual/Estimate 
LHA (R) Milestone A July 2001 January 2002 July 2001 
LHA 6 Start Contract 
Design 
May 2005 November 2005 May 2005 
Advance Procurement 
Contract 
July 2005 January 2006 July 2005 
LHA 6 Milestone B January 2006 July 2006 January 2006 
Contract Award December 2006 June 2007 June 2007 
Start Fabrication November 2007 May 2008 January 2008 
Float Off August 2010 February 2011 May 2012 
Ship Delivery December 2011 June 2012 October 2013 
Operational Evaluation 
Start 
August 2012 February 2013 August 2014 
Operational Evaluation 
Complete 
September 2013 March 2014 December 2014 
Initial Operational 
Capability 
September 2013 March 2014 April 2015 
 
The LHA (R) Program followed the notional shipbuilding schedule through the 
summer of 2006. Up to that point, the LHA 6 design had been finalized with a well deck 
still in the plans. LHA 6 experienced an unprecedented event as her final design was 
changed right before construction began on the project without any alteration to the 
acquisition schedule. Key personnel in the Navy and the Northrop Grumman contractors 
made an inauspicious decision to remove the well deck from the LHA 6 plans to favor the 
extra space required for the maintenance and support of the MV-22 Osprey and F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter (Harrison). 
This design decision violated the Mission Need Statement for the LHA (R) 
Program that was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and JROC in early 2001. 
The Mission Need Statement is a document generated by the JCIDS process in order to 
set forth the required performance parameters the project must meet to accomplish its 
objective. A specific requirement in the Mission Need Statement for the LHA (R) 
Program was “through the execution of the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver the LHA (R) 
will enable the forcible entry, reconstitution, and redeployment of the U.S. Marine Corps 
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warfighting assets through air and surface delivery (Reynolds 2).” It also listed that the 
replacement LHAs have a “floodable well deck sized for three LCACs or two LCUs 
(Reynolds 3).” 
Why a major change in the design of the new LHA?  There were several factors 
that went into skewing the acquisitions process for the LHA (R). The biggest issue, like 
most projects, was with overall cost and finding ways to save money. The Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations argued for the removal of the well deck to save money and 
capitalize on the heavy investments made in the V-22 and F-35 Programs. In essence, the 
Navy wanted to push for a specific platform where the controversial Osprey and 
expensive Joint Strike Fighter could make a permanent home (Work 221–222). Another 
reason for the shift in design was to accommodate for aviation-centric missions in the 
Arabian Gulf operational environment. The argument was to focus on the development 
and deployment of aviation assets since the current war was being fought in Afghanistan, 
a place where landing craft could not roam (Sullivan 9). The impacts of these design 
decisions will be explored further in Chapter IV. 
Nonetheless, the fate of LHA 6 was sealed as construction on the first amphibious 
assault ship without a well deck since the 1950s began in January 2008. Unexpected 
delays have pushed the LHA (R) Program further off track with an expected ship delivery 
date of the fall of 2013 instead of the summer of 2012 (“Schedule for LHA 6 AMERICA 
CLASS”). The delay in delivery of LHA 6 to the fleet has caused the Navy to extend the 
service life of the remaining older LHAs which are long past their expected 
decommissioning dates. This delay also causes setbacks to the Navy’s future shipbuilding 
plans as it will delay the fleet’s goal of reaching 33 amphibious ships by 2016 (Labs 21). 
The LHA 6 Detail Design and Construction contract was awarded to Northrop 
Grumman Shipbuilding on 15 July 2005, having a fixed price of $2.8 billion for 
procurement of the first ship in the class. Table 8 is a summary of the LHA 6 budget from 
2005 to 2011 for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement. 
Procurement funds dramatically increased in 2009–2010 and again in 2010–2011 due to 
the allocation of funds for LHA 7 and 8. The rise in procurement funds for LHA 6 to 
$3.167 billion in 2007–2008 can be attributed to the change in design to accommodate 
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the desired aviation platforms along with additional and unexpected costs of onboard 
self-defense weapon systems. The new total cost estimate for LHA 6 is approximately 
$4.5 billion, $1.7 billion more than what was originally expected (Department of the 
Navy Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimates 15–1). In essence, the Navy looked to save 
money by eliminating the well deck but ended up spending almost 40 percent more 
because of the radical change. 
Table 8.   LHA 6 Cost and Funding (After “Cost & Funding for LHA 6 AMERICA 
CLASS”). 
LHA 6 Cost and Funding ($ in millions) 
Transition Year RDT&E Procurement 
2005–2006 197.5 2,896 
2006–2007 198.8 2,880.1 
2007 198.8 3,082.1 
2007–2008 200.9 3,167 
2009–2010 264.4 6,561.2 
2010–2011 327.2 10,996.8 
 
C. PREVIOUS DESIGN MODELS 
In order to develop and recommend the best case solution for future amphibious 
ships for the U.S. Navy, previous ship design models should be examined and analyzed. 
Lessons learned from prior examples will aid in the success of future developments. The 
three design models examined here are the U.S. SSN-21 Seawolf class submarines, the 
Japanese World War II Light Aircraft Carriers, and the U.S. LPH Iwo Jima class 
amphibious assault ships. 
1. SSN-21 Seawolf Class Submarines 
The Seawolf submarine program began in the 1980s to counter the Soviet Union 
threat and maintain underwater superiority throughout the remainder of the Cold War. 
From bow to stern, the Seawolf class was designed to have the latest technology any ship 
had ever seen to operate autonomously against the world’s best combatants (“SSN-21 
Seawolf-class: Overview”). The primary mission of these highly sophisticated 
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submarines was to hunt, track, and destroy Soviet ballistic missile submarines before they 
could attack any U.S. targets (“SSN-21 Seawolf-class”). Additionally, Seawolf would 
have the capability to conduct battlespace preparation, intelligence gathering, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, perform advanced communications, and operate under the 
polar ice cap for extended periods of time over the span of a 30 year life cycle. The 
Seawolf was designed to have the highest tactical speed of any U.S. submarine, but still 
being the most silent of all of the stealthy predators hiding beneath the ocean surface 
(“SSN-21 Seawolf-class: Overview”). 
The Seawolf class, numbering 29 strong, was supposed to be the most dominant 
submarine force in the world; after all, it would have the best weapons, sensors, 
communications, and propulsions technology that had ever been developed. The biggest 
problem for the Seawolf program, however, came with the end of the Cold War and fall 
of the Soviet Union much sooner than anticipated. The top reason why the Seawolf 
submarine was designed and created was to combat the Soviets. With the enemy 
effectively gone, the need for this new sophisticated weapon dramatically decreased. The 
second biggest issue that Seawolf faced was that by being the best in the world meant 
being the most expensive in the world. The program was projected to cost approximately 
$33.6 billion in 1991 for 12 boats, a steep drop from the original 29 that were planned, 
making it the most expensive submarine ever built in history (“SSN-21 Seawolf-class”). 
If the Navy continued on with the construction of the Seawolf class, it would have spent 
25 percent of its budget on a ship designed for an enemy that no longer existed. In 1995 
the Seawolf program was terminated by Congress, ending the class at three submarines 
that cost billions of dollars (“SSN-21 Seawolf-class: Overview”). In summary, the 
reasons for failure of this ship model are as follows: 
 Designed a submarine for a future purpose but the future dramatically 
changed. 
 The enemy that the submarine was intended to destroy no longer existed. 
 Cost of the program outweighed the benefits. 
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2. Japanese World War II Light Aircraft Carriers 
The initial idea and design for light aircraft carriers was developed in the 1930s 
by Japan and used by both them and the United States during World War II in the Pacific 
theater. Japan’s purpose for designing and constructing this new type of carrier was for 
the need to increase ship speed to keep pace with American carriers and to supplement 
their fleet carriers with additional aircraft (Parshall and Tully 8–9). The first design the 
Japanese experimented with was the Ryujo, which had a single, unobstructed flight deck, 
two hangar decks, and was considerably shorter at 513 feet long as compared to the fleet 
carriers which were close to 800 feet. This preliminary design proved to be impractical 
due to the ship being top-heavy with 48 planes on the flight and hangar decks and it 
displacing only 8,000 tons. This created a dangerous stability issue and failed to address 
the requirement of additional speed (Isom 46). Japan fared better in the ensuing designs 
of their next two carriers, the Soryu and Hiryu, which were initially called fleet carriers 
but later classified as light carriers since they displaced only 10,500 tons each and carried 
40 aircraft (Isom 47–48). By comparison, the Japanese prized fleet carriers, Akagi and 
Kaga, displaced 30,000 to 40,000 tons and carried close to 100 aircraft each (Parshall and 
Tully 6–8). Soryu and Hiryu were characterized for their speed due to their cruiser-style 
hull, lower profile in the water, 152,000 shaft horsepower engines and virtually no heavy 
armor to weigh the ship down. The design trade-off here was for speed in which 
protective armor was sacrificed, proving later to hurt the Japanese during crucial battles 
in the war (Parshall and Tully 9). 
Japan’s light carrier design had the potential to be the great asset they needed to 
defeat the United States in the Pacific during World War II. The manner in which they 
deployed and utilized this asset, along with design flaws, however, is why this particular 
model failed the Imperial Fleet. The Japanese doctrine and military thought process at the 
time believed strongly in massing airpower and using large fleet carriers to crush the 
enemy with a decisive victory (Parshall and Tully 87). Japan won battles at the beginning 
of the war in the Pacific because they simply brought more carriers with more aircraft to 
overwhelm their enemy (Parshall and Tully 405). The light carriers were designed to 
supplement the fleet carriers with additional aircraft, not to hold off the American fleet 
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single handedly. As the war in the Pacific drew on, the Japanese relied too heavily on 
their light aircraft carriers to perform up to the fleet carrier standard and seemed to forget 
the original design of those carriers. Several design features contradicted Japanese 
doctrinal thinking. Overall the light carriers were smaller and naturally carried a smaller 
amount of aircraft onboard. Because the Japanese maxed out the amount of aircraft 
onboard the carrier, serious deck-load spotting issues occurred that affected timing of 
assaults in critical battles. Soryu and Hiryu had great difficulty spotting a large force 
because the smaller flight decks could not accommodate extra aircraft and still leave 
enough run-off room forward for takeoff. The landing cycle also created problems as 
pilots waiting to land ran out of fuel before aircraft on deck could be moved out of the 
way (Parshall and Tully 87). The trade-off of speed over armor came in to play during the 
Battle of Midway as Soryu and Hiryu were ill-equipped to take and absorb hits which 
prevented them from continuing to fight in battle (Parshall and Tully 248). Both carriers 
took immediate and irreparable damage, knocking them out of the battle and removing 
them from the war (Parshall and Tully 251). In the end, the Japanese light carriers could 
only play in small roles of the Pacific War due to the size of the air groups, again 
conflicting with Japanese doctrine, and not having enough room to support and maintain 
the aircraft, crew, fuel and other aviation necessities onboard (Parshall and Tully 418). 
The light carriers proved to be inefficient with the costs out-weighing the benefits 
(Parshall and Tully 419). 
To summarize why the Japanese light aircraft carrier model failed: 
 Experimental designs that were not fully perfected. 
 Unbalanced trade-offs for speed in the ship design, particularly the 
sacrifice of heavy armor during a major war. 
 Employment and design did not fit Japanese doctrine and military 
thinking. 
3. U.S. LPH Iwo Jima Class Amphibious Assault Ships 
The Amphibious Assault Ship (Helicopter) or Landing Platform Helicopter as it 
was commonly referred to as, was designed and built in the 1950s to transport up to 1,700 
fully equipped Marines into combat areas of operation by landing them ashore using air 
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assets (“LPH-2 IWO JIMA Class: Overview”). The LPH Iwo Jima class was the first to 
be designed and built from the keel up as an amphibious assault ship (“USS Iwo Jima 
(LPH 2)”). While several follow-on ships in this class were modeled after USS Iwo Jima 
(LPH 2), a few were converted from older escort carriers, making this class a unique 
group of ships (Polmar 190). The length and displacement of each ship varied because of 
the mixture of designs and conversions, ranging from 600 to 800 feet and 20,000 to 
40,000 tons respectively (“LPH-2 IWO JIMA Class: Overview”). Similar to that of the 
Japanese World War II light aircraft carriers, the initial LPH was a preliminary design for 
a specific amphibious assault ship. LPHs could accommodate a full Marine battalion and 
operate both rotary and fixed winged aircraft; however, it did not have a wet well for 
amphibious landing craft (Polmar 190). 
Essentially, the LPHs were another type of light aircraft carrier with a specific 
focus on Marine aviation. This ship design was not a complete failure as it was utilized 
with success throughout the wars of the 1950s to the early 1990s, but was limited in its 
capabilities and functions. LPHs caused a shift in the Navy and Marine Corps’ thought 
and design process as together each service realized that having both a well deck and 
flight deck was essential to conducting successful amphibious operations (“Marine 
Question the Utility of Their New Amphibious Warship”). The Marines, being the 
versatile force they are, have always required the ability to operate on air, land, and sea. 
Limiting the capabilities onboard the LPHs resulted in limiting the Marine Corps 
capabilities to get ashore and accomplish the mission. The correct assessment was made 
in the 1950s that the Navy and Marine Corps team needed a ship specifically used for 
amphibious assault, however, the design put an unnecessary limit on how the Marines 
landed and hindered their capabilities. 
To summarize why the LPH model failed: 
 The employment and design did not fit the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps 
doctrine. 
 Limited the capabilities of the landing force. 
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4. Lessons Learned 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the previous three design models: 
 No one can truly predict what the future will bring, but it can be bounded. 
Designs should be flexible enough to allow relative changes and leave 
room for growth and development. 
 No matter what, it will cost a substantial amount of money to develop, 
design, and construct any new ship. While all too often money is the 
driving factor in making design decisions, in a perfect world, it should be 
a balance between the needs, requirements, and cost. 
 Fitting a round peg in a square hole still will not work. Ship design should 
fit the accepted doctrine and training of the Navy and Marine Corps and 
not vice versa. 
 Mediocre models can lead to great models. Instead of throwing out 
previous models and starting from scratch, make changes to improve the 
ones already in place. 
 Learn from past mistakes. Study the history and thinking behind each 
relative design model to learn best practices of what to do and what not to 
do. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the new amphibious assault ship model and the important 
design changes associated with the new LHA class. The load configurations of the ship 
along with its expected aviation assets were also discussed. The America class LHAs will 
be dominated by the MV-22 Osprey and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter but lack the 
defining characteristic of an amphibious ship: the well deck. Through the examination of 
the acquisition life cycle, it was discovered how design decisions are normally made in 
the notional shipbuilding process. The LHA (R) Program followed this process to a 
certain extent and then shifted when a major design decision occurred well after the plans 
for construction were finalized with no revisit or evaluation of the requirements set in the 
Mission Need Statement. Finally, previous design models were analyzed to discover 
lessons learned from past miscalculations in order to best determine and recommend the 
future course of action for amphibious design. The impacts and analysis of these 
amphibious design decisions will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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IV. AMPHIBIOUS MODEL DATA ANALYSIS 
A. COMPARISON OF CURRENT AND FUTURE AMPHIBIOUS MODELS 
The LHA Tarawa class and LHA (R) America class of amphibious assault ships 
represent two different amphibious models in the United States Navy. While the future 
America class is set to replace the older Tarawa class ships in the fleet, each have 
significant differences in design and amphibious lift capacity. A comparison and analysis 
has been performed using the lift footprints and data presented for both ship classes, 
which is summarized in Table 9. From the side by side comparison of both classes, 
looking solely at the numerical data for each, it was determined that the LHA Tarawa 
class has a stronger advantage over the LHA America class in most categories. 
Table 9.   LHA Tarawa Class vs. LHA (R) America Class.1 
LHA Tarawa Class and LHA (R) America Class Comparison 
Lift Footprints LHA Tarawa Class LHA (R) America Class Advantage 
Troop Berthing 2,000 1,871 Tarawa 
Vehicle Square (SqFt) 25,400 10,328 Tarawa 
Cargo Cube (CuFt) 105,900 160,000 America 
Aircraft (CH-46 Eq) 42 45 America 
LCAC Spots 1 0 Tarawa 
Characteristics LHA Tarawa Class LHA (R) America Class   
Max Speed (knots) 24 22 Tarawa 
Cruising Speed (knots) 20 14–17 Tarawa 
Range (nautical miles) 10,000 10,000 Even 
Medical Capability 4 OR, 17 ICU, 48 
Ward, 4 Isolation 
2 OR, 24 Ward Tarawa 
Hangar Bay (SqFt) 18,104, 4 frames 
high 
25,937, 7 frames high America 
LCU Spots 2–4 0 Tarawa 
AAVs Embarked  45 0 Tarawa 
 
                                               
1 Information gathered from various sources: (“LHA 6 Information” 4–6, “LHA-1 Tarawa Class,” 
Tucker 101, and “United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R)”). 
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The lift footprints are essential characteristics of amphibious ships that depict the 
total capacity of assault shipping utilized in amphibious operations (Joint Publication 1–
02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 20). These five 
figures are vital to amphibious operational planning and preparation as they express how 
many troops can be embarked, how much equipment and supplies can be carried, and 
amount of vehicles and aircraft that can be utilized and stowed aboard. Exploring each of 
the five footprints line by line shows that the Tarawa class holds a greater advantage in 
three of these categories: troop berthing, vehicle square footage, and LCAC spots. Troop 
berthing is the amount of racks, or beds, on board the ship which corresponds to the 
number of Marines that can be embarked on board at a given time. The Tarawa class has 
roughly a 130 to 150 rack advantage over that of the America class, allowing it to fit the 
required number of personnel in a typical MEU on board. The MEU is organized and 
manned with a certain number of personnel based off of the amount of space allotted on 
board. Decreasing the amount of racks available on the LHA America class will force the 
MEU commanders to reorganize their troops and possibly leave important assets behind 
on the pier. Much the same can be said regarding the amount of square feet for vehicle 
stowage. The Tarawa class has about 15,000 square feet more room for vehicles than the 
America class. Again the MEU is organized to depend upon a set configuration of 
vehicles required for amphibious operations and will be forced to restructure typical plans 
and procedures while leaving valuable assets on the pier. 
While the difference between the numbers of LCAC spots is one between the 
Tarawa and America class, the significance of that one spot is of great proportion 
considering the controversy surrounding the removal of the well deck. The one spot 
represents the absence or presence of an entire sealift capability. As described in the 
previous chapters, the America class will not have any landing craft capabilities due to 
the deletion of the well deck from the new LHA design. By taking away a crucial 
capability, the defining feature of the amphibious assault ship, it clearly gives the 
advantage to the Tarawa class by immense proportions. Removal of the well deck 
automatically limits the lift capabilities of the ship to land Marines along with their 
equipment, supplies, cargo, and vehicles ashore. While the LHA America class has less 
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vehicle stowage space, the Sailors and Marines onboard will still have to contend with 
getting which ever vehicles were embarked to the beach using only the available rotary 
wing aircraft. Landing the troops and their equipment ashore during any amphibious 
operation will become much more complicated, complex, time consuming, and 
dangerous if air assets are the only available means of transportation. It may also expose 
a great shortfall in the reduced number of operating rooms and ward beds. Eliminating 
the well deck capability and thereby decreasing the assets that the landing force has 
available violates the proven OMFTS and STOM doctrinal principles that are utilized by 
both the Navy and Marine Corps. Both documents preach overwhelming operational 
tempo that overpowers the enemy, not giving them time to react to the situation.  
An essential element of this principle is the elimination of an operational pause 
once the landing force has reached the objective area. With both a landing craft and 
aircraft capability, the LHA Tarawa class ships have the ability to achieve these 
principles as Marines, their equipment, vehicles, and supplies land ashore almost all at 
once. The LHA America class will not support the OMFTS and STOM doctrine as its 
lone aviation assets will not be able to maintain a fast operational tempo due to the lift 
capabilities and restrictions placed on the aircraft. Amphibious landings will take a lot 
longer since each vehicle, piece of cargo, equipment, and Marine personnel transfer must 
be airlifted separately ashore. Physics and aircraft safety procedures prevent a full load of 
Marines in the helicopter while slinging heavy loads beneath it with the cargo hook. 
From a mission specific viewpoint, the removal of the well deck severely limits the ship’s 
potential contributions during a major amphibious assault because of the reasons just 
mentioned (Work 222). It also takes away the ability to gain access to ports, especially 
those destroyed in natural disasters, preventing the LHA America class from being an 
effective asset in humanitarian operations. The projection of power and combat missions 
will change for the America class as it shifts to the aircraft carrier mentality and away 
from the amphibious approach. Two other characteristics listed in Table 9 that are not 
one of the footprints but related to number of LCAC spots are number of LCUs and 
AAVs that each class can carry. Depending on the configuration, the Tarawa class can 
embark two or four LCUs or 45 AAVs at a given time. Again, since the America class 
 60 
does not have well deck and therefore cannot carry landing craft, the advantage obviously 
goes to the Tarawa class. Eliminating the well deck will force the Marine Corps to 
change and restructure how they plan for and conduct amphibious operations along with 
pushing them away from proven tactics, techniques, and procedures found in current 
Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. 
The well deck issue also comes into play with the last two lift footprints of cargo 
space and aircraft spots, which, by numerical value, the America class has the advantage 
over the Tarawa class. The new LHA will have roughly 54,000 more cubic feet of cargo 
space available on board the ship. More cargo space is definitely a great benefit; 
however, the same lift problem arises with getting the required cargo ashore to the 
objective area with only air assets that add to the weight constraints. The additional space 
can also be misleading as most of it came from the removal of the well deck to be utilized 
for extra aircraft part and supply storage. In reality the added space will be used for the 
upkeep and maintenance of the space consuming MV-22 Osprey and F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter and not for additional amphibious operational needs. The America class also has a 
slight advantage in amount of aircraft spots by three over the Tarawa class since it was 
designed after an LHD model that accommodates for a slightly larger number of aircraft. 
The relative significance of this advantage is small and is not a major contributing factor 
to the amount of MV-22 Osprey or F-35 Joint Strike Fighters that the new LHA will be 
able to embark. 
The several other characteristics listed in Table 9 are also important to note since 
they play a role in amphibious assault ship missions as well. The maximum and cruising 
speeds of each class of ship are mentioned to demonstrate another design shift on board 
large deck amphibious ships. The older LHA Tarawa class ships are powered by steam 
turbines that give it a two knot maximum speed advantage and a few knot cruising speed 
advantage over its replacement. With a push to save money on fuel and use more 
economical ways to conserve on gas in the Navy, the LHA America class, like that of its 
design model LHD 8, will be a hybrid of gas turbine and electric power. While this newer 
propulsion design slightly drives down the maximum and cruising speeds of the new 
LHA class, it provides a more efficient gas mileage as times between refueling increase. 
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The Tarawa class has the speed advantage while the America class has the benefit of 
newer propulsion technology. Relating to speed is the range of each ship as it represents 
the maximum distance the ships can travel without refueling. The America class is 
expected to have about the same range of 10,000 nautical miles as the Tarawa class, 
making the advantage even in this category. Both classes also have the ability to refuel at 
sea which thereby extends their range to travel all throughout the globe. 
The next two characteristics are interrelated due to the removal of the well deck 
and making the LHA America class an aviation only platform for the MV-22 Osprey and 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The medical space and capabilities on board the Tarawa class 
is roughly double that of the America class since the hangar bay was extended both 
horizontally and vertically to support aircraft maintenance and storage for the new air 
assets. The America class lost two operating rooms, the entire intensive care unit, 24 
ward beds, and the isolation space, leaving it with just two operating rooms and 24 ward 
beds total. This greatly hinders the ship’s ability to render assistance on board during 
humanitarian operations, one of the main missions amphibious assault ships have been 
assigned. Limiting the medical facilities on board a ship with a large crew and embarked 
landing force is a serious disadvantage and major risk, especially if there is a mass 
casualty situation on board or an amphibious withdrawal when Marines will need medical 
attention. Amphibious assault ships are greatly relied upon for their mobile medical 
facilities and personnel by the Joint Force Commander in operational theaters throughout 
the world. As humanitarian operations are becoming more routine missions for the Navy 
and Marine Corps, extensive medical facilities along with the capability to carry 
specialized teams, doctors, and other essential medical personnel are required to perform 
these objectives. The design decision to make room for costly air assets does not match 
the current operational mentality and contradicts the Navy’s mission statement of being a 
“Global Force for Good.” Like the well deck, the large medical ward on board 
amphibious assault ships is another unique, essential feature and asset that they bring to 
the fleet and to the mission. 
In general, the comparison and analysis between the two classes of ships shows a 
significant number of trade-offs made to ensure that two struggling and financially 
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burdening aircraft have a place to call home. Capabilities that the Navy and Marine Corps 
have come to rely on will no longer be at their disposal. The removal of the well deck is 
the most radical change and is a major trade-off in favor of the aviation platform. As 
determined from the lessons learned in three previous design models described in Chapter 
III, no one can truly predict what the future will bring. At the same time, the Navy and 
design contractors violated one of the most important lessons learned in just about any 
situation: learn from past mistakes. The Navy and Marine Corps already tried the 
amphibious assault ship without a well deck once in the 1950s with the deployment of the 
LPH Iwo Jima class. From that design mistake it was already determined that both a well 
deck and flight deck were a vital necessity to conduct effective amphibious operations. 
The wrong color green was used to make these radical changes in amphibious design as 
cost drove the LHA (R) Program instead of requirements and performance. Making 
crucial trade-offs for unproven aircraft, such as sacrificing a full medical facility is 
unwise. The new LHA design is forcing the amphibious fleet to dramatically change their 
doctrine, training, and known practices because it needs to change for the sake of 
changing. One conflict in a land locked area does not determine that every conflict in the 
future will be exactly the same. Missions and operational environments change from war 
to war and conflict to conflict. Limiting the Navy and Marine Corps’ future capabilities 
will take away the unique, powerful, and advantageous assets that are unmatched by any 
enemy throughout the world. As seen through the comparison of the two ships, the older 
Tarawa class has a much bigger advantage over the America class in almost every 
category of amphibious operations. 
B. LIFT EQUATIONS 
To further demonstrate the effects of removing the well deck in the new LHA 
amphibious assault ship, several lift equations were developed from the typical landing 
craft and aircraft configurations of the current and future amphibious models. These 
equations were used in calculating the amount of time required to conduct an amphibious 
landing in order to prove which LHA configuration was the most efficient and effective. 
The five aircraft and landing craft configurations, as described in Chapters II and III, 
include: 
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 LHA 1: 1 LCAC/2 LCUs for equipment transfer, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s for 
personnel transfer. 
 LHA 1: 4 LCUs for equipment transfer, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s for 
personnel transfer. 
 LHA 1: 45 AAVs for personnel transfer one way, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s 
for personnel transfer. 
 LHA 6: Combined Aircraft Configuration, 12 MV-22s for equipment and 
personnel transfer. 
 LHA 6: MEU Mix Aircraft Configuration, 12 MV-22s/4 CH-53s for 
equipment and personnel transfer. 
LHA 1 refers to the overall Tarawa class while LHA 6 refers to the overall 
America class. The terms “LHA 6,” “America class,” “new LHA,” and “LHA (R)” are all 
synonymous in this chapter. The LHA 1 AAV configuration is treated differently as 
AAVs are owned and operated by Marines and will stay with the MEU on the beach; 
hence the one way calculation ashore. The AAV configuration is not a typical landing 
craft load out used to transfer equipment ashore since their purpose is to transport 
Marines and a small amount of cargo to the beach during an opposed landing. This 
configuration is still included to demonstrate another available asset to the landing force 
to conduct opposed landings if necessary. 
The aircraft chosen in the lift equations are based on the typical Marine ACE 
embarked onboard each ship. The current ACE assets include: 12 CH-46 Sea Knights, 
four CH-53 Sea Stallions, three UH-1 Hueys, four AH-1 Super Cobras, and six AV-8B 
Harriers. The Super Cobra and Harrier aircraft are only used for strike purposes and do 
not have any lift abilities. The Huey is used for command and control and aerial 
reconnaissance and also does not have any lift ability. This leaves the Sea Knight and Sea 
Stallion to do the heavy lifting. The future ACE assets are reflected within the two 
expected aircraft configurations onboard the America class: Combined and MEU Mix. 
The Combined Configuration will have 12 MV-22 Ospreys and 12 F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighters as all the lifting ability will reside with the Osprey. The MEU Mix will consist 




Cobras combined, and four CH-53 Sea Stallions. This again just leaves the Osprey and 
the Sea Stallion to conduct the personnel and equipment lifts of the amphibious 
operation. 
The assumption made for the lift equations was that each landing craft and aircraft 
would utilize their maximum lift capability, as described in Chapters II and III and 
Appendices A and B. The five lift equations developed are as follows: 
Table 10.   Amphibious Lift Equations. 
LHA 1: 1 LCAC/2LCUs for equipment, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s for personnel 
1 LCAC + 2 LCUs = 1 wave 
75 tons + 2*(170 tons) = 415 tons/wave 
12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s = 1 wave 
(12 CH-46s)*(17 personnel) + (4 CH-53s)*(55 personnel) = 424 personnel/wave 
 LHA 1: 4 LCUs for equipment, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s for personnel 
4 LCUs = 1 wave 
4*(170 tons) = 680 tons/wave 
12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s = 1 wave 
(12 CH-46s)*(17 personnel) + (4 CH-53s)*(55 personnel) = 424 personnel/wave 
 LHA 1: 45 AAVs for personnel one way, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s for personnel 
45 AAVs = 1 wave 
45*(24 Marines, which include 3 crew members) = 1,080 personnel per/wave 
12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s = 1 wave 
(12 CH-46s)*(17 personnel) + (4 CH-53s)*(55 personnel) = 424 personnel/wave 
 LHA 6: Combined Aircraft Configuration, 12 MV-22s for equipment and personnel 
12 MV-22s = 1 wave 
Personnel: (12 MV-22s)*(24 personnel) = 288 personnel/wave 
Equipment: MV-22 can only lift 1 piece of equipment at a time; single hook up to  
5 tons and dual hook up to 7.5 tons 
(12 MV-22s)*(1 vehicle/cargo hook load) = 12 loads/wave 
 LHA 6: MEU Mix Aircraft Configuration, 12 MV-22s/4 CH-53s for equipment and personnel 
12 MV-22s + 4 CH-53s = 1 wave 
Personnel: (12 MV-22s)*(24 personnel) + (4 CH-53s)*(55 personnel) = 508 personnel/wave 
Equipment: MV-22 can only lift 1 piece of equipment at a time; single hook up to  
5 tons and dual hook up to 7.5 tons; CH-53 can only lift 1 piece of equipment at a time up to 13 tons 





Each of these five equations can be applied to their respective ship classes to an 
amphibious landing situation to determine the amount of time each configuration will 
take to conduct an operation. The example amphibious situation that these equations will 
be applied to in this thesis is the transfer of equipment and personnel from the LHA to the 
amphibious objective area ashore 25 nautical miles away. This is an arbitrary distance 
chosen to represent an over the horizon amphibious landing that keeps the ship far 
enough away from land to avoid visual detection. The amount of personnel in the landing 
force was the maximum amount that each ship class could embark. For LHA 1 it is 2,000 
personnel and for LHA 6 it is 1,871 personnel. The equipment chosen in this scenario 
represents the principle weapons, equipment, and vehicles in an average MEU, which are 
depicted in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Example of Typical MEU Equipment.2 
Example of Typical MEU Equipment 
Equipment Number Weight of 1 Unit Total Tons 
M1A1 Tank 4 70 tons 280 
LAV 16 14.1 tons 225.6 
155 mm Howitzers 6 5 tons 30 
81 mm Mortars 8 90 pounds 0.36 
60 mm Mortars 12 50 pounds 0.3 
MK19 40 mm 24 120 pounds 1.44 
TOW Launchers 8 305 pounds 1.22 
Javelins 8 20 pounds 0.08 
.50 Cal Machine Guns 24 124 pounds 1.488 
HMMWV 92 2.6 tons 239.2 
7 Ton Trucks 30 7 tons 210 
Forklift 1 6.75 tons 6.75 
D7 Dozer 1 25 tons 25 
ROWPUS 2 3.65 tons 7.3 
  
Total 1028.738 
Rounded for Calculations: 1,000 tons of equipment total 
                                               
2 Information gathered from various sources: “.50 Cal Machine Gun: Specifications,” “Caterpillar D7 
Bulldozer,” “CH-53E Super Stallion,” “FGM-148 Javelin,” “History: CH-46 Sea Knight,” “M1AI Abrams 
Tank,” “M777 Lightweight 155mm howitzer,” “Mark 19,”  “United States Marine Corps: Roles & 
Missions” 28, “United States Marine Corps Weapons & Equipment: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV) (M998 Truck),” “United States Marine Corps Weapons & Equipment: Light Armored 
Vehicle-25 (LAV-25),” “United States Marine Corps Weapons & Equipment: M224 60mm Lightweight 
Mortar,” “United States Marine Corps Weapons & Equipment: M252 81mm Medium Extended Range 
Mortar,” “United States Marine Corps Weapons & Equipment: Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit,” 
and “United States Marine Corps Weapons & Equipment: Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided 
(TOW) Missile Weapon System.” 
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There were several assumptions made in this amphibious situation to limit the 
variables and complexity of the calculations. The purpose of these time/distance 
computations is to prove which class of ship is more efficient and effective at completing 
its primary mission of amphibious landings. These calculations are solely looking at the 
numerical values of number of personnel and equipment weight in tons to determine the 
amount of time to and from the beach and total time of the amphibious landing. Loading 
and embarkation plans on board the ship, landing craft, and aircraft were not considered 
since there are numerous ways to configure each for beach landings. For LHA 1, it was 
assumed that the landing craft would lift and transfer all equipment ashore while the 
helicopters lifted all personnel. For LHA 6, it could only be assumed that equipment and 
personnel were lifted by helicopter. Other variables held constant and assumed to have 
the same affects in each situation of this analysis were crew rest, aircraft breakdowns and 
maintenance, refueling time, loading time on the ship, and weather restrictions. Lastly, 
arbitrary offload times at the beach were assumed and incorporated into the round trip 
time of each landing craft and aircraft. These assumptions are illustrated in Table 12. The 
equipment offload times for each helicopter is zero since each piece is being carried by 
hook under the aircraft and dropped off at the beach without the helicopter landing. 
Essentially it takes no time to drop the piece of equipment off at the beach before starting 
the return trip back to the ship. 
Table 12.   Craft Offload Time Assumptions. 
Offload Time Assumptions 
Craft Time 
LCAC 10 min. 
LCU 15 min. 
AAV N/A 
CH-53 Personnel 3 min. 
CH-53 Equipment 0 min. 
CH-46 Personnel 2 min. 
CH-46 Equipment 0 min. 
MV-22 Personnel 3 min. 
MV-22 Equipment 0 min. 
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The time/distance calculations for each landing craft and aircraft are shown in 
Table 13. These calculations along with the lift equations were applied to the amphibious 
landing situation to determine lift times for each configuration. The time/distance 
calculations for each of the five configurations can be seen in Table 14. Figure 5 is a 
visual representation of the amount of time it takes each craft to reach the beach along 
with their respective assumed offload times. A summary of the final lift times for each 
configuration is shown in Table 15. 
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Table 13.   Time/Distance Calculations for Each Landing Craft and Aircraft. 
LCAC 
Speed = 40 knots, Distance = 25 nautical miles, Time = Distance/Speed 
Time = 25 nm/40 kts  = 0.625 hours = 37.5 minutes to the beach 
Round Trip = 1 hour 15 minutes + 10 minute offload time 
LCAC Round Trip = 1 hour 25 minutes 
 LCU 
Speed = 11 knots, Distance = 25 nautical miles, Time = Distance/Speed 
Time = 25 nm/11 kts = 2.27 hours = 2 hours 16 minutes to the beach 
Round Trip = 4 hours 32 minutes + 15 minute offload time 
LCU Round Trip = 4 hours 47 minutes 
 AAV 
Speed = 5 knots, Distance = 25 nautical miles, Time = Distance/Speed 
Time = 25 nm/5 kts  = 5 hours to the beach 
AAV One Way Trip = 5 hours 
 CH-46 
Speed = 135 knots, Distance = 25 nautical miles, Time = 
Distance/Speed 
Time = 25 nm/135 kts = 0.185 hours = 11 minutes to the beach 
Round Trip = 22 minutes 
Round Trip Personnel = 22 minutes + 2 minutes offload time = 24 
minutes 
 CH-53 
Speed = 160 knots, Distance = 25 nautical miles, Time = 
Distance/Speed 
Time = 25 nm/160 kts = 0.15625 hours = 9 minutes to the beach 
Round Trip = 18 minutes 
Round Trip Personnel = 18 minutes + 3 minutes offload time = 21 
minutes 
 MV-22 
Speed = 250 knots, Distance = 25 nautical miles, Time = 
Distance/Speed 
Time = 25 nm/250 kts = 0.1 hours = 6 minutes to the beach 
Round Trip = 12 minutes 




Figure 5.   Craft Travel Time to Amphibious Objective Area with Offload Time 
Assumptions. 
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Table 14.   Time/Distance Calculation for Each Configuration. 
LHA 1: 1 LCAC/2LCUs for equipment, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s for personnel 
LHA 1 Personnel = 2,000  Equipment Weight = 1,000 tons 
Equipment: 1 LCAC + 2 LCUs = 1 wave, 415 tons lift/wave 
Number of Waves = 1,000 tons/415 tons lift/wave = 2.4 waves 
2.4 waves = 2 waves + 1 LCU 
Total Craft = 2*(1 LCAC + 2 LCUs) + 1 LCU = 2 LCACs + 5 LCUs 
Total Time = 2*(1 hr. 25 min.) + 5*(4 hr. 47 min.) 
Total Equipment Lift Time = 26 hours 45 minutes 
Personnel: 12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s = 1 wave, 424 personnel/wave 
Number of Waves = 2,000 personnel/424 personnel/wave = 4.7 waves 
4.7 waves = 4 waves + 4 CH-53s + 4 CH-46s 
Total Craft = 4*(12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s) + 4 CH-53s + 4 CH-46s 
Total Craft = 52 CH-46s + 20 CH-53s 
Total Time = 52*(24 min.) + 20*(21 min.) 
Total Personnel Lift Time = 27 hours 48 minutes 
Total Lift Time = 54 hours 33 minutes 
 LHA 1: 4 LCUs for equipment, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s for personnel 
LHA 1: Personnel = 2,000  Equipment Weight = 1,000 tons 
Equipment: 4 LCUs = 1 wave, 680 tons lift/wave 
Number of Waves = 1,000 tons/680 tons lift/wave = 1.47 waves 
1.47 waves = 1 wave + 2 LCUs 
Total Craft = 1*(4 LCUs) + 2 LCUs = 6 LCUs 
Total Time = 6*(4 hrs. 47 min.) 
Total Equipment Lift Time = 28 hours 42 minutes 
Personnel: 12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s = 1 wave, 424 personnel/wave 
Number of Waves = 2,000 personnel/424 personnel/wave = 4.7 waves 
4.7 waves = 4 waves + 4 CH-53s + 4 CH-46s 
Total Craft = 4*(12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s) + 4 CH-53s + 4 CH-46s 
Total Craft = 52 CH-46s + 20 CH-53s 
Total Time = 52*(24 min.) + 20*(21 min.) 
Total Personnel Lift Time = 27 hours 48 minutes 
Total Lift Time = 56 hours 30 minutes 
 LHA 1: 45 AAVs for personnel one way, 12 CH-46s/4 CH-53s for personnel 
LHA 1 Personnel = 2,000 
Personnel: 45 AAVs = 1 wave, 1 way, 1,080 personnel/wave 
Number of Waves = 1 
Total Personnel Lift Time AAV = 5 hours 
Personnel: 920 remaining to be lifted by helicopter 
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Personnel: 12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s = 1 wave, 424 personnel/wave 
Number of Waves = 920 personnel/424 personnel/wave = 2.17 waves 
2.17 waves = 2 waves + 1 CH-53 + 1 CH-46 
Total Craft = 2*(12 CH-46s + 4 CH-53s) + 1 CH-53 + 1 CH-46 
Total Craft = 25 CH-46s + 9 CH-53s 
Total Time = 25*(24 min.) + 9*(21 min.) 
Total Personnel Lift Time Helicopter = 13 hours 9 minutes 
Total Personnel Lift Time = 18 hours 9 minutes 
 LHA 6: Combined Aircraft Configuration, 12 MV-22s for equipment and personnel 
LHA 6 Personnel = 1,871   Equipment Weight = 1,000 tons 
Equipment: Can only lift 1 vehicle/piece of cargo at a time, 1 wave = 12 MV-22s 
*Lose 4 M1A1 Tanks, 16 LAVs and 1 D7 Dozer because of weight limit 
6 trips for 6 Howitzers (1 at a time) 
1 trip for 8 81 mm & 12 60 mm Mortars (combined cargo sling) 
1 trip for 24 Mk-19s (cargo sling) 
1 trip for 8 TOW Launchers (cargo sling) 
1 trip for 8 Javelins (cargo sling) 
1 trip for 24 .50 Cal Machine Guns (cargo sling) 
92 trips for 92 HMMWVs (1 at a time) 
30 trips for 30 7 Ton Trucks (1 at a time) 
1 trip for 1 Forklift 
2 trips for 2 ROWPUS (1 at a time) 
Total Trips = 136 
Total Craft = 136 trips/12 MV-22s/wave = 11.33 waves 
11.33 waves = 11 waves + 4 MV-22s = 136 MV-22s 
Total Time = 136*(12 min.) 
Total Equipment Lift Time = 27 hours 12 minutes 
Personnel: 12 MV-22s = 1 wave, 288 personnel/wave 
Number of Waves = 1,871 personnel/288 personnel/wave = 6.5 waves 
6.5 waves = 6 waves + 6 MV-22s 
Total Craft = 6*(12 MV-22s) + 6 MV-22s 
Total Craft = 78 MV-22s 
Total Time = 78*(15 min.) 
Total Personnel Lift Time = 19 hours 30 minutes 
Total Lift Time = 46 hours 42 minutes 
 LHA 6: MEU Mix Aircraft Configuration, 12 MV-22s/4 CH-53s for equipment and 
personnel 
LHA 6 Personnel = 1,871   Equipment Weight = 1,000 tons 
Equipment: Can only lift 1 vehicle/piece of cargo at a time, 1 wave = 12 MV-22s + 4 
CH-53s 
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*Lose 4 M1A1 Tanks, 16 LAVs and 1 D7 Dozer because of weight limit 
6 trips for 6 Howitzers (1 at a time) 
1 trip for 8 81 mm & 12 60 mm Mortars (combined cargo sling) 
1 trip for 24 Mk-19s (cargo sling) 
1 trip for 8 TOW Launchers (cargo sling) 
1 trip for 8 Javelins (cargo sling) 
1 trip for 24 .50 Cal Machine Guns (cargo sling) 
92 trips for 92 HMMWVs (1 at a time) 
30 trips for 30 7 Ton Trucks (1 at a time) 
1 trip for 1 Forklift 
2 trips for 2 ROWPUS (1 at a time) 
Total Trips = 136 
Total Craft = 136 trips/(12 MV-22s + 4 CH-53s/wave) = 8.5 waves 
8.5 waves = 8 waves + 8 MV-22s 
Total Craft = 8*(12 MV-22s + 4 CH-53s) + 8 MV-22s 
Total Craft = 104 MV-22s + 32 CH-53s 
Total Time = 104*(12 min.) + 32*(18 min.) 
Total Equipment Lift Time = 30 hours 24 minutes 
Personnel: 12 MV-22s + 4 CH-53s = 1 wave, 508 personnel/wave 
Number of Waves = 1,871 personnel/508 personnel/wave = 3.68 waves 
3.68 waves = 3 waves + 4 CH-53s + 6 MV-22s 
Total Craft = 3*(12 MV-22s + 4 CH-53s) + 4 CH-53s + 6 MV-22s 
Total Craft = 42 MV-22s + 16 CH-53s 
Total Time = 42*(15 min.) + 16*(21 min.) 
Total Personnel Lift Time = 16 hours 6 minutes 
Total Lift Time = 46 hours 30 minutes 
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LHA 1: 1 
LCAC/2 LCUs 
26 hrs. 45 
min. 
27 hrs. 48 
min. 
54 hrs. 33 
min. 
Yes 
27 hrs. 48 
min. 
LHA 1: 4 LCUs 28 hrs. 42 
min. 
27 hrs. 48 
min. 
56 hrs. 30 
min. 
Yes 
28 hrs. 42 
min. 
LHA 1: 45 
AAVs* 
5 hrs. 
13 hrs. 9 
min. 
18 hrs. 9 
min. 
Yes 




27 hrs. 42 
min. 
19 hrs. 30 
min. 
46 hrs. 42 
min. 
No 
46 hrs. 42 
min. 
LHA 6: MEU 
Mix 
30 hrs. 24 
min. 
16 hrs. 6 
min. 
46 hrs. 30 
min. 
No 
46 hrs. 30 
min. 
*Assumed personnel transfers ashore only combined with personnel transfers by LHA 1 
helicopter configuration. Not a suitable landing craft configuration for transporting 
both equipment and personnel ashore. Time for AAVs is one-way only. AAV Equipment 
Lift Time is lift of personnel in AAV landing craft, Personnel Lift Time is lift of personnel 
by helicopter. 
 
From the data and calculations, it can be concluded that the Tarawa class LHAs 
are more effective and efficient at amphibious landings than the America class LHAs will 
be. While the combined lift times for LHA 1 are greater than the LHA 6 as seen in Figure 
7, the actual total lift times, as seen in Figure 8, are substantially smaller since landing 
craft and aircraft lift occur simultaneously. The America class will not have the luxury of 
a dual amphibious lift capability and will effectively take twice as long to conduct an 
amphibious landing ashore. Of the five configurations, the “LHA 1: 1 LCAC/2 LCUs” is 
the most efficient as it combines both speed, with the LCAC, and gross tonnage lift, with 
the LCUs, together along with a concurrent means of transporting personnel ashore. The 
least efficient means of conducting an amphibious landing is with the “LHA 6: 
Combined” configuration as it only has 12 MV-22s to lift both equipment and personnel 
ashore. Both LHA 6 configurations had 129 less personnel to transport than the LHA 1 
configurations and both failed to transport all of the required MEU equipment. Because 
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of the lift weight limits on board the MV-22 and CH-53, four M1A1 Tanks, 16 Light 
Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and one D7 Dozer could not be transported ashore. 
The comparison of equipment and personnel lift time results, seen in Figures 5 
and 6, are interesting to note as the slower landing craft on LHA 1 prove to be the faster 
means to transport equipment ashore while the helicopters on LHA 6 are the fastest 
means to transport personnel to the beach. The equipment lift times are slower in the 
LHA 6 configurations since each piece is airlifted one at a time. The “LHA 6: MEU Mix” 
configuration was expected to have a faster equipment lift time than the “LHA: 
Combined” since it has four additional aircraft to carry the loads. However, it was proved 
that more is not necessarily better as it took the MEU Mix almost three additional hours 
to transport the equipment ashore due to the CH-53’s longer flight time to the beach than 
the MV-22. These results also show that while the new air assets on board LHA 6 may 
transport personnel ashore at a faster rate they will have to sit on the beach, vulnerable, 
for an additional 27 to 30 hours waiting for all their equipment to arrive before carrying 
out the mission. The best configuration in this realistic amphibious landing situation 
would therefore be a combination of one LCAC and two LCUs for equipment transport 
along with the MEU Mix for personnel transport ashore, which would require the ship to 
have both a well deck and flight deck capability. 
For this particular situation, the AAV configuration would not be feasible because 
it does not fit the purpose of the event nor the event fitting the purpose of the AAV. 
Because of this, the AAV configuration was left out of the comparisons in Figures 6 
through 9. Again, AAVs are Marine owned and operated and stay with the MEU 
throughout their mission. Due to the slow speed of the AAVs through the water, they 
typically will not be launched from the ship more than five nautical miles from shore. 
Removal of the well deck affects this Marine Corps capability as they not only lose a 
means to storm the beach during an opposed landing but also lose a land based troop and 
cargo transport as well. 
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Figure 6.   Equipment Lift Time. 
 
Figure 7.   Personnel Lift Time. 
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Figure 8.   Combined Lift Time. 
 
Figure 9.   Actual Total Lift Time. 
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The time/distance problem is an issue that the Navy and Marine Corps struggle 
with during amphibious operations because it involves several trade-offs. As enemy 
weapons systems become more sophisticated with greater threat ranges, the stand-off 
distances off shore increase in order to protect the high value units, or ships. The focus 
has shifted in recent years to conducting operations “over the horizon” and away from 
possible enemy detection. While the distance away from land is good for the ships, it 
becomes an issue for the landing craft and aircraft since they have to travel farther to land 
the troops ashore. The additional stand-off distance for amphibious ships shifts 
vulnerability to aircraft flying over the unprotected littorals and places them in more 
susceptible ports. This is not as big an issue, however, for the faster aircraft but more for 
the slower landing craft to overcome. The LCAC’s speed helps overcome the 
time/distance problem but sacrifices load tonnage to do so. Adding distance adds more 
travel time which slows the progress of the landing. Reverting back to the OMFTS and 
STOM principles, each stresses the importance of maintaining an overwhelming 
operational tempo yet the time/distance issue works against it. It is easy to then say that 
an aviation only platform fits into these doctrinal principles. However, the lift time 
calculations showed that a need for both a simultaneous landing craft and aircraft 
capability is required to conduct efficient amphibious operations or else the times double. 
This dilemma will remain an issue for the Navy and Marine Corps Amphibious 
Commanders to deliberate on to determine the appropriate trade-off of maintaining a fast 
operational tempo versus amount of protection and risk to the high value units. 
C. IMPACTS ON THE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP AND AMPHIBIOUS 
FLEET 
The side by side comparison of the two LHA classes revealed major differences 
in design that affected how amphibious operations are conducted on board and were 
reflected in the lift equations and example situation previously analyzed. The major 
changes made to the new LHA class not only affect the shipboard capabilities but the 
overall capability of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) as well. The purpose of the 
ARG is to transport a landing force to a given location to conduct amphibious operations. 
The ARG typically consists of three amphibious ships; one amphibious assault ship 
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(LHA or LHD), one amphibious transport dock (LPD), and one dock landing ship (LSD). 
The LHA/LHD is the command and control ship for the ARG as the Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG) and/or Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) staffs are embarked onboard. 
Each LPD and LSD class has a well deck that can embark LCACs, LCUs and AAVs and 
perform the same general amphibious functions as the LHA/LHD but on a smaller scale. 
Looking at the three amphibious assault ship classes, LHA Tarawa, LHD Wasp, 
and LHA America, alone shows that each brings different assets to the ARG and can 
impact how amphibious operations are conducted. For example, the number of LCAC 
spots is different on all three with Tarawa having one, Wasp having three, and America 
of course having zero. Depending on what ship class is in the ARG will impact the time 
and loading plan for a single amphibious operation. As seen in the time/distance example 
in the previous section, the number of available assets can drastically add or subtract lift 
time to the scenario. Table 16 compares the five lift footprints of several classes of ships 
that can be placed in an ARG. The two classes of amphibious transport docks are the 
LPD 4 Austin class and LPD 17 San Antonio class. The two classes of dock landing ships 
are the LSD 41 Whidbey Island class and LSD 49 Harpers Ferry class. The LPD classes 
have the ability to embark aircraft while both LSD classes cannot since they do not have 
a hangar bay for storage. LSDs do have the ability to conduct flight operations but will 
mostly be utilized for landing cargo and equipment ashore via landing craft. A major 
difference to note between the two LSD classes is in amount of cargo cube available. The 
LSD 49 class is the cargo variant that trades off LCAC spots for more cargo room, which 
















LHA 1 2,000 25,400 105,900 42 1 
LHA 6 1,871 10,328 160,000 45 0 
LHD 1 1,871 15,955 113,187 42 3 
LPD 4 900 14,000 51,000 4 1 
LPD 17 720 23,000 36,000 4 2 
LSD 41 454 10,000 5,100 0 4 
LSD 49 454 15,500 50,700 0 2 
 
From the ship classes listed in Table 16, 12 different possible ARGs were formed 
and compared. These comparisons can be seen in Tables 17 through 28. The ARG 
number itself has no significant importance. ARGs 1 through 4 have LHA 1 as their 
command ship. ARGs 5 through 8 have LHA 6 as their command ship. ARGs 9 through 
12 have LHD 1 as their command ship. The groups are not arranged in any significant 
order and represent the possible combinations of the command ships with the various 
LPD and LSD classes. 
Table 17.   ARG 1 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHA 1 2,000 25,400 105,900 42 1 
LPD 4 900 14,000 51,000 4 1 
LSD 41 454 10,000 5,100 0 4 
Total 3,354 49,400 162,000 46 6 
 
                                               
3 Information gathered from various sources: “Amphibious Assault Ship Well Deck Analysis: 
Executive Summary” 4, “LHA-1 Tarawa Class,” “LHA 6 Information” 4-6, “LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift 
Comparison” 16, Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-31B Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Data 
Book 9-14 and 18-23, “United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA (R),” 
“United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious Transport Dock – LPD,” “United States Navy Fact File: Dock 
Landing Ship - LSD.”  
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Table 18.   ARG 2 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHA 1 2,000 25,400 105,900 42 1 
LPD 17 720 23,000 36,000 4 2 
LSD 41 454 10,000 5,100 0 4 
Total 3,174 58,400 147,000 46 7 
 
Table 19.   ARG 3 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHA 1 2,000 25,400 105,900 42 1 
LPD 4 900 14,000 51,000 4 1 
LSD 49 454 15,500 50,700 0 2 
Total 3,354 54,900 207,600 46 4 
 
Table 20.   ARG 4 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHA 1 2,000 25,400 105,900 42 1 
LPD 17 720 23,000 36,000 4 2 
LSD 49 454 15,500 50,700 0 2 
Total 3,174 63,900 192,600 46 5 
Table 21.   ARG 5 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHA 6 1,871 10,328 160,000 45 0 
LPD 4 900 14,000 51,000 4 1 
LSD 41 454 10,000 5,100 0 4 
Total 3,225 34,328 216,100 49 5 
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Table 22.   ARG 6 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHA 6 1,871 10,328 160,000 45 0 
LPD 17 720 23,000 36,000 4 2 
LSD 41 454 10,000 5,100 0 4 
Total 3,045 43,328 201,100 49 6 
 
Table 23.   ARG 7 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHA 6 1,871 10,328 160,000 45 0 
LPD 4 900 14,000 51,000 4 1 
LSD 49 454 15,500 50,700 0 2 
Total 3,225 39,828 261,700 49 3 
 
Table 24.   ARG 8 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHA 6 1,871 10,328 160,000 45 0 
LPD 17 720 23,000 36,000 4 2 
LSD 49 454 15,500 50,700 0 2 
Total 3,045 48,828 246,700 49 4 
 
Table 25.   ARG 9 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHD 1 1,871 15,955 113,187 42 3 
LPD 4 900 14,000 51,000 4 1 
LSD 41 454 10,000 5,100 0 4 
Total 3,225 39,955 169,287 46 8 
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Table 26.   ARG 10 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHD 1 1,871 15,955 113,187 42 3 
LPD 17 720 23,000 36,000 4 2 
LSD 41 454 10,000 5,100 0 4 
Total 3,045 48,955 154,287 46 9 
 
Table 27.   ARG 11 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHD 1 1,871 15,955 113,187 42 3 
LPD 4 900 14,000 51,000 4 1 
LSD 49 454 15,500 50,700 0 2 
Total 3,225 45,455 214,887 46 6 
 
Table 28.   ARG 12 Total Lift Footprints. 










LHD 1 1,871 15,955 113,187 42 3 
LPD 17 720 23,000 36,000 4 2 
LSD 49 454 15,500 50,700 0 2 
Total 3,045 54,455 199,887 46 7 
 
Table 29 shows the comparison of the 12 possible ARGs and lists the totals of 
each lift footprint that the groups contain. A visual representation of the data in Table 29 




Table 29.   ARG Comparison. 
 
ARG Comparison 







ARG 1 3,354 49,400 162,000 46 6 
ARG 2 3,174 58,400 147,000 46 7 
ARG 3 3,354 54,900 207,600 46 4 
ARG 4 3,174 63,900 192,600 46 5 
ARG 5 3,225 34,328 216,100 49 5 
ARG 6 3,045 43,328 201,100 49 6 
ARG 7 3,225 39,828 261,700 49 3 
ARG 8 3,045 48,828 246,700 49 4 
ARG 9 3,225 39,955 169,287 46 8 
ARG 10 3,045 48,955 154,287 46 9 
ARG 11 3,225 45,455 214,887 46 6 
ARG 12 3,045 54,455 199,887 46 7 
 
 
Figure 10.   Total Number of Personnel Each ARG Can Embark. 
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Figure 11.   Vehicle Square Footage of Each ARG. 
 
Figure 12.   Cargo Cube of Each ARG. 
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Figure 13.   Number of Aircraft Spots (CH-46 Equivalent) on Each ARG. 
 
Figure 14.   Number of LCAC Spots on Each ARG. 
Knowing which amphibious ships make up an ARG is important for both Naval 
and Marine Corps Commanders to understand because of the differences in lift of each 
class. As seen from the comparison data of each possible ARG, there is much disparity 
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among the groups’ lift footprints. Overall, the LHA 6 and LHD 1 ARGs are most similar, 
mainly since the new LHA class is modeled after the LHD design. This is 
counterintuitive since it would make logical sense that the LHA classes would be similar. 
Subjectively, it is hard to determine which ARG is best as a number of different factors 
come into play, such as mission type, environment, operational theater, and operational 
requirements. For example, a mission might require a heavy aircraft presence in which 
the LHA 6 ARGs would be most effective. On the other hand, a mission might require a 
large amphibious landing in which the LHD 1 or LHA 1 ARGs would be the better 
choice for the operation over the LHA 6 ARGs. With the frequent changes in amphibious 
operational requirements, the Navy should ultimately decide on the most flexible option 
since it will have the ability to accomplish a wider range of missions and objectives. 
From a quantitative perspective, comparing the ARGs becomes a much easier task. 
Looking at the personnel lift footprint, all of the ARGs meet the requirement of 
embarking and transporting a full MEU. The average number of Marines in a single 
MEU is about 2,200 (“United States Marine Corps: Roles & Missions, Organization, 
Capabilities, Employment Considerations, Concepts, Programs, & Current Issues” 27). 
Each ARG has room to spare as they all can fit well over 3,000 personnel across each of 
the three ships. ARGs 6, 8, 10, and 12 have the lowest number totaling 3,045 personnel 
as the LPD 17 class holds roughly 200 less troops than the LPD 4 class. The LHA 1 
makes up for this loss in ARGs 2 and 4, which still shows a drop in number but remains 
above 3,100 personnel. ARGs 1 and 3 hold the highest number of personnel once again 
attributing to the extra space for troops on board LHA 1. Overall, all 12 ARGs meet the 
personnel requirement as a MEU will typically consist of less than 3,000 troops, 
however, getting the Marines to the amphibious objective area is not even half the battle. 
The LHA 1 ARGs hold a clear advantage in amount of vehicle square footage. 
ARGs 1 through 4 have the most space for vehicles and dominate in this category. Each 
of the remaining ARGs has less than 50,000 square feet for vehicle stowage, except one, 
ARG 12. Typically the MEU will require about 160 vehicles, which will range from 
45,000 to 55,000 in vehicle square feet (“United States Marine Corps: Roles & Missions, 
Organization, Capabilities, Employment Considerations, Concepts, Programs, & Current 
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Issues” 27). This becomes an issue for ARGs 5 through 12 as vehicles will be left on the 
pier because they cannot fit in storage on the ships. Looking ahead ten years to future 
MEU lift requirements, the estimated total amount of square footage needed is almost 
90,000, well above what any of the current ARGs can carry (“Amphibious Assault Ship 
Well Deck Analysis: Executive Summary” 5). This is currently a red flag issue that the 
Marine Corps is assessing to determine how much of an impact it will have on MEU 
capabilities. It will obviously have some kind of effect, most likely decreasing the 
amount of capability the ground combat element will have, whether its mobility, 
firepower, or general output power. Overall, the LHA 1 ARGs meet the current vehicle 
square foot lift requirements. However, in the near future none of the current 12 possible 
ARGs will be able to lift the desired amount of vehicles the MEU intends to operate with, 
leaving a gap in the current ARG make up. 
Relating to vehicle square footage is amount of cargo cube each ARG can carry. 
The LHA 6 ARGs have the clear advantage in this category as the removal of the well 
deck and aviation design expansion in the America class opened up more space for cargo 
storage. ARG 7 has the greatest amount of cargo cube available, towering at 260,000 
cubic feet, as each ship in the group has the greatest amount of cargo room in their 
respective classes. ARG 2 has the lowest amount of cargo space available, falling below 
150,000 cubic feet. Amount of cargo cube available is important because it plays a major 
role in the MEU 15 day sustainment requirement and to the extent of how many 
humanitarian supplies can be carried in a disaster relief effort. Future MEU cargo lift 
requirements estimate that 170,000 cubic feet of space will be needed to fit all the 
necessary items (“Amphibious Assault Ship Well Deck Analysis: Executive Summary” 
5); leaving a gap for ARGs 1, 2, 9 and 10. 
The LHA 6 ARGs also have a clear cut advantage in number of aircraft spots only 
because the America class has three additional spots. The magnitude of this advantage is 
not very significant because there are only three additional spots available in these ARGs. 




however, each ARG will be able to embark the new aircraft just in a slightly more limited 
capacity. Overall, every ARG will be able to meet current and future aircraft 
requirements. 
Lastly, the number of LCAC spots in each ARG varies from three to nine among 
all the groups. As seen in the lift equations and time/distance example, the amount of 
landing craft utilized in amphibious operations can make a big difference. Current and 
future MEU lift requirements dictate that six or more LCAC spots are needed to 
effectively conduct amphibious operations (“Amphibious Assault Ship Well Deck 
Analysis: Executive Summary” 5). Not meeting this requirement are ARGs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 
8. All of the LHD 1 ARGs fit this category best, and, even though ARGs 3 and 4 fall 
under the requirement, each still have a well deck and other means (LCUs and AAVs) to 
offload and land troops and their equipment ashore. Only one of the LHA 6 ARGs meets 
this requirement: ARG 6 with six LCAC spots between the LPD and LSD. Overall, the 
LHD 1 ARGs meet this requirement effectively. 
The data suggest that there is no right or wrong ARG solution for what the Navy 
and Marine Corps currently have in their arsenal. Each possible ARG has its advantages 
and disadvantages when it comes to lift capabilities. All of the lift footprints illustrate a 
tough trade-off to consider in the shipbuilding industry: a given amount of space versus 
where to put everything and how much of that everything will meet the requirements. 
The LHA 6 model sacrificed LCAC spots and a major capability for cargo cube and 
greater aviation ability. LHA 1 has a greater amount of vehicle square footage but 
sacrifices additional hangar bay space for aircraft in doing so. This trade-off holds true in 
a group of ships, as demonstrated through the ARG comparisons. Each of the 
combination of ships have unique lift footprints that may give one ARG a great 
advantage in a particular area of amphibious warfare but may seriously lack in another. 
The trade-offs in lift footprints encountered among each ARG is not necessarily a bad 
thing. Each mission is different and may require more or less of a capability. This allows 
the ARG to be tailored to every mission as it gives the Navy and Marine Corps more 
options to choose from. Consequently, the possible ARGs cannot be used in a “plug and 
play” sense with the MEU because each has different lift configuration to consider. 
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Additional planning for the commanders is necessary to properly address the different lift 
footprints each ARG offers in order to successfully deploy and accomplish the mission. 
Further studies conducted by the Navy and Marine Corps Operational Test and 
Evaluation Activities on ESG lift comparisons found similar results. One study in 
particular did a comparative analysis of a LHA 6 ARG versus a LHD 1 ARG to assess 
potential operational impacts. An operational assessment of the new America class LHA 
was performed unusually early in the life cycle the summer of 2005 because the Analysis 
of Alternatives never examined this new amphibious configuration. The purpose of this 
study was to determine the impacts of lost capabilities associated with an undefined 
CLOP, or capability/cargo left on the pier (“LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift Comparison” 3). 
The two ARGs compared were LHD 1 – LPD 17 – LSD 41 and LHA 6 – LPD 17 – LSD 
41. The parameters established by the Operational Test and Evaluation Activities 
included a year 2015 MEU force list of personnel and amount of equipment, vehicles, 
and cargo that the MEU would require. A load plan was developed for each MEU that 
incorporated four principles: 1) employ current MEU stowage techniques, 2) maximize 
available square feet to maintain operational flexibility, 3) maximize mobile landing of 
vehicles, and 4) minimize cross-deck requirements (“LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift 
Comparison” 4). From the list of parameters, the Operational Test and Evaluation 
Activities established an equipment density list (EDL) which depicts an inventory of 
equipment and amount for each element of the MEU. The EDL established for the study 
can be seen in Appendix C (“LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift Comparison” 9–11). The 
comparison of the load results show that an LHD ARG is fully capable of meeting the 
current MEU requirements while the LHA ARG falls short of the mark. The results are 
summarized in Tables 30 and 31. 
Even with double stacking cargo containers and using a flight deck spot on the 
LSD 41 for stowage, the LHA 6 ARG still cannot meet the MEU lift requirements. A 
substantial amount of items, 96, are left on the pier, which decreases the capability of the 
MEU and jeopardizes their 15 day sustainment requirement. Many of the CLOP items 
summarized in the study included several vehicles, replacement parts, and supplies, 
which will negatively impact the MEU’s mission and degrade their sustainment 
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capability (“LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift Comparison” 17–18).   Interesting to note is the 
ARGs that the Operational Test and Evaluation Activities chose to compare. As the older 
LHA Tarawa class ships are being decommissioned out of service, the LHD is currently 
the dominant amphibious assault ship in the fleet. The LPD 17 class was chosen as they 
are newer and replacing the older LPD 4 class ships. The Operational Test and 
Evaluation Activities elected to go with more LCAC spots over cargo cube and storage 
space as they chose to use LSD 41 over the cargo variant LSD 49 class. With the required 
number of LCAC spots at 6, the only combination of ships that worked with the LHA 6 
was LPD 17 and LSD 41, which was previously discussed in the possible 12 ARG 
comparative analysis. Overall this study shows that the new LHA ARG will not meet all 
the MEU lift requirements and suggests that possible alternatives are needed to address 
this capability gap. 
Table 30.   LHD 1 ARG (From “LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift Comparison” 16). 
LHD 1 ARG 
Ship LHD 1 LPD 17 LSD 41 EDL Loaded CLOP 
Square Feet 19,145 22,356 19,473 60,974 0 
Items 233 218 158 609 0 
Personnel 1,325 567 393 2,285 N/A 
 
Table 31.   LHA 6 ARG (From “LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift Comparison” 16). 
 
LHA 6 ARG 
Ship LHA 6 LPD 17 LSD 41 EDL Loaded CLOP 
Square Feet 11,115* 20,904 19,346 51,365 9,608 
Items 154 199 160 513 96 
Personnel 1,218 657 392 2,267 N/A 
*Includes 40 double stacked QUADCONs (1,547 sqft), actual LHA 6 
square feet on deck is 10,328 
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As shown through the ARG comparative analysis data and evidence, there will be 
impacts to amphibious mission planning, operational capabilities, and amphibious 
landing execution due to the various lift configurations in changing shipboard 
environments. The primary mission, the reason why amphibious ships exist, is to 
transport Marines and their equipment ashore by the most effective means possible. 
Eliminating a major capability in the largest ship of the ARG will negatively impact how 
missions are planned and executed. Because of the changes in amphibious design, 
capabilities in the form of vehicles, cargo, supplies, and even personnel will be left 
behind on the pier which adds risk that may jeopardize the success of the mission. 
Understandably there are several trade-offs made from ship to ship and from ARG to 
ARG. As design changes are made in subsequent ship classes, it ultimately changes the 
capabilities and make up of an ARG, resulting in an inability for commanders to “plug 
and play” each ARG into operations and missions. Regardless of the ARG type, joint 
theater commanders need to know what assets the amphibious forces have in order to 
deploy them the most effectively. 
Adjusting the capabilities gap that the LHA 6 ARGs will have may be a daunting 
task for the Navy and Marine Corps to accomplish. Two possible solutions are to either 
add an additional amphibious ship to the ARG or have the LHA 6 operate independently. 
Adding an additional LPD or LSD to the ARG would increase the lift footprints enough 
to meet the MEU lift requirements. However, it would cause other issues for the 
amphibious fleet, such as ship maintenance and training schedule issues and altering 
other ARGs. Shifting the ARG mentality would at first disrupt LPD and LSD schedules 
that could quickly escalate to major problems if required maintenance cannot be 
performed on time leading to possible failures at sea. Second, other ARGs in the fleet 
would be affected as one of the ships from the group would be pulled away to the LHA 6 
ARG, rendering the group ineffective. Fewer ARGs in the fleet may mean a decrease in 
projection of power missions and available assets for naval requirements. Each dilemma 
could be overcome but would require a greater amount of trade-offs with additional risk. 
The LHA 6 might better suit the amphibious fleet if it steamed independently with its 
own missions as the LHD Wasp class ships took the lead in each ARG. As seen in the 
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single ship comparison of the LHAs, the America class would not be an effective means 
to perform independent amphibious landings and would most likely take on an aircraft 
carrier role in the fleet. While this seems the most likely role for LHA 6, it does defeat 
the purpose of building a replacement LHA amphibious assault ship in the first place. 
The America class was intended to be the center of the ESG/ARG and be the dominate 
ship in the amphibious fleet. This certainly will not be the case as the ship lacks the 
command and control, lift, and transport capabilities required for amphibious operations. 
Enacting either of the solutions will cause a major shift in traditional amphibious 
practices and force changes across the entire amphibious fleet. 
The decision to make a major cultural shift onboard what is supposed to be the 
future ship of the amphibious Navy was done so in haste and prematurely without proper 
analysis. The entire purpose of having a standardized acquisition and decision making 
process is to ensure hasty, irrational decisions are not made at the expense of the 
warfighter. For instance, the LHA (R) Analysis of Alternatives study, a crucial tool in 
acquisition decision making, did not even consider the possibility of having an 
amphibious ship without a well deck because it was impractical do to so and did not 
fulfill the key performance parameters dictated by the Navy. Each recommended design 
had both the facilities and space to accommodate the extra aviation assets and maintain a 
well deck. In the blink of an eye, however, the Navy shifted its rudder and forced the 
Marine Corps into an undesired culture change in amphibious operations without 
considering the impacts it would have on the naval service. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
The ability of the United States Navy and Marine Corps to conduct amphibious 
operations throughout the world is a vital asset that no other country can rival. The shift 
in future amphibious ship design, however, has threatened the integrity of this asset by 
degrading the capabilities that the warfighter constantly relies upon. The removal of the 
well deck and loss of crucial lift capacities in the new LHA (R) America class 
amphibious assault ships have presented a major dilemma for the Navy and Marine Corps 
as future assets will not be able to fully integrate with current, proven doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. 
Amphibious warfare doctrine along with a detailed analysis of current and future 
capabilities were presented in this thesis to determine how a shift in amphibious warfare 
design decisions would affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities. It was determined that 
the loss of the well deck would wreak havoc on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
amphibious operations and seriously hinder the warfighters’ ability to accomplish 
missions at a high level of proficiency. The America class LHAs will not be an effective 
contributor during any combat or humanitarian operations that involve some type of 
amphibious landing because it will be unable to meet all of the lift requirements of a 
landing force. Because it is an aviation only platform, the new LHAs will be forced to 
leave crucial capabilities on the pier since the helicopters on board have much greater 
weight and lift constraints and will not be able to carry certain Marine equipment and 
vehicles. Additionally it was shown that the America class LHAs will have a drastic 
increase in the amount of time it would take to conduct an amphibious landing ashore due 
to the fact that it only has aircraft to lift both personnel and equipment. Current 
amphibious assault ships have a clear advantage in this category because they have the 
dual flight deck and well deck capability that allows for simultaneous operation of 
aircraft and landing craft to land a force ashore in half the amount of time as the future 
LHA. The shift in amphibious design will also make “accessing the inaccessible” twice 
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as hard for the Navy and Marine Corps to accomplish, especially during humanitarian aid 
and assistance missions, as the ship’s performance capabilities have literally been cut in 
half. 
Making extreme changes and design decisions to the largest asset of the 
amphibious fleet has also violated the traditional, accepted doctrine that has been 
practiced and trained to perfection over the past several decades. The forced culture shift 
of operating without a well deck capability has taken Sailors and Marines by surprise as 
they are not prepared to continue to operate using the same amphibious warfare 
principles. That being the case, the America class LHAs will most likely act and be 
treated as a light aircraft carrier instead of an amphibious assault ship. This violates the 
entire purpose of why the new ship was created in the first place: to displace the older 
LHA Tarawa class and be the center of the Expeditionary Strike Group/Amphibious 
Ready Group. The new LHAs will not be able to do this if it does not act like an 
amphibious assault ship and thus repeating the vicious cycle of contradiction. 
The secondary research question this thesis posed was to determine how design 
decisions are made in the military. The Department of Defense acquisition’s life cycle 
was examined and analyzed to answer this question. It was found that decisions to 
acquire new programs are made at a high level of authority, residing at the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff positions. Using the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, the 
Joint Chiefs and their staffs essentially conduct a capabilities gap analysis and determine 
what programs to further pursue. In the case of the LHA (R) Program, a need arose to 
replace the aging amphibious assault ships in the fleet. Design decisions for the new LHA 
began following program inception at the highest levels of the Department of the Navy 
along with the shipbuilders and contract designers from Northrop Grumman. Examining 
the acquisition’s process as it applied to the LHA (R) Program revealed that it can be just 
as complex as it sounds with many hands “stirring the pot” to further complicate matters. 
Design decisions have as much to do with requirements, performance, and intended 
purpose as politics, cost, and personal agendas. The LHA (R) Program was unfortunately 
susceptible to these factors which caused the decision making process to break down and 
almost fall apart. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the facts and evidence provided along with the current and future MEU 
lift requirements, it was determined that the best recommended amphibious model for the 
Navy and Marine Corps would be to have a large amphibious assault ship with both a 
well deck and flight deck capability for simultaneous operations. As the Navy and Marine 
Corps work together it is vital that their equipment work mutually with one another. The 
MEU is a flexible and powerful force because of the balance it maintains within its 
organization that relies on aviation and ground assets to accomplish the mission. 
Therefore, the amphibious ship model should maintain that balance of force and have 
both a well deck and flight deck in the design. If the amphibious requirements remain in 
place or even increase in the future as expected, both assets will be a vital necessity in 
order to perform operations at the same high level of expectations. Whether it is a combat 
or humanitarian mission, the dual aircraft and landing capability along with a substantial 
medical facility on board that can accommodate a mass casualty situation will be required 
to accomplish the objective that the amphibious fleet is so accustomed to doing. As the 
focus of the United States’ military strategy is on accessing the inaccessible, the question 
is how to accomplish this task. The answer is using the versatile and unique amphibious 
assets comprised of air and surface forces. 
The most unique of the amphibious assets is the well deck because it expands on 
the amount of capabilities that the landing force has and can use. With the shifting focus 
to “over-the-horizon” amphibious landings, the best well deck configuration is to have 
three LCAC spots as seen in the LHD Wasp class. Three LCAC spots are desired so that 
the amphibious ship can be matched up with any combination of LPD or LSD and still 
maintain the required six or more total LCAC spots within the ARG. As seen in the 
amphibious doctrine, the Marine Corps favors a faster landing craft with an over the 
horizon capability in order to maintain a favorable operational tempo to overwhelm the 
enemy at the beach. While it may take additional LCAC loads to transport all the 
equipment to the objective area, its speed allows for a better simultaneous push to the 
beach in conjunction with the aircraft and helps to eliminate the undesired operational 
pause. The LCU is still a valuable asset and will also be an available craft that the 
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proposed amphibious model ship can embark. Having a well deck onboard the ship will 
also allow for the embarkation of AAVs for opposed landings as well, increasing the 
combat capability of the fleet. 
The concern for space for the new aviation assets onboard an amphibious assault 
ship is the main reason why the well deck was eliminated. While the dollar cost is 
understandably an issue, the warfighter should not have to suffer the performance cost 
and make risky sacrifices when it comes to required capabilities. In order to 
accommodate the MV-22 Osprey and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, it is recommended 
that the amphibious assault ship be expanded in length, width, and height, particularly in 
the hangar bay. Expanding the size of the ship will allow for the additional space needed 
for maintenance and stowage of the aircraft while keeping a large medical facility and 
well deck on board. To gain more room on the flight deck, space can be traded-off on the 
island that extends up from the deck itself. Two previous classes of amphibious assault 
ships have made the dual well deck – flight deck coexistence work, proving that this 
concept can be accomplished. The proposed overall expansion of the amphibious assault 
ship would also add to the amount of rack space available for the embarked troops. This 
is an added benefit in the personnel lift footprint category as valuable assets will not be 
left on the pier. 
Tackling the vehicle square footage and cargo cube footprints is a difficult task 
that even the Navy and Marine Corps are currently struggling with. Basically it again all 
comes down to space on board the ship. Expanding the overall size of the ship will 
relieve some of the tension and leave fewer items behind on the pier. For current 
requirements, the best model to follow is again the LHD Wasp class as it has been proven 
that an LHD ARG can lift a MEU and their equipment. To accommodate future MEU lift 
requirements it is recommended that the Navy invest in more Maritime Prepositioning 
Force ships to supplement the ARGs. Another possible solution involves investing in 
more amphibious ships that can be added to the ARGs making the group even at four 
ships instead of three. Telling the Marines or the President they “can’t have any more 
toys” is also one more possibility but not highly recommended. 
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Therefore, the recommended lift footprint requirements that the amphibious 
model should meet include: 
 Personnel: Between 2,000 and 2,100 embarked troops. 
 Vehicle Square Footage: Between 27,000 and 30,000 square feet. 
 Cargo Cube: Between 120,000 and 130,000 cubic feet. 
 Aircraft Spots: Between 46 and 49 CH-46 equivalent spots (full size flight 
deck). 
 LCAC Spots: 3 (full size well deck). 
Each recommended lift footprint expands on the current LHA and LHD 
amphibious assault ships. These lift footprints will meet the current and expected future 
lift requirements for the landing force, except for future vehicle square footage. This 
issue is currently being examined by the Navy and Marine Corps for the purpose of 
developing alternatives in vehicle transport and stowage. Two possible solutions for this 
problem involve adding a fourth ship to the Amphibious Ready Group and/or further 
development and construction of a Maritime Prepositioning Force. 
In summary, the recommended proposed amphibious model will have both a 
flight deck and well deck that can accommodate the current landing craft and current and 
future aircraft. It will be an extended, larger version of current amphibious assault ships 
with a substantial medical facility and troop berthing space. The expansion of the ship 
will allow for enough required vehicle and cargo space to carry all MEU equipment. 
Additional Maritime Prepositioning Ships may be required in the future if MEU lift 
requirements expand beyond ARG carrying capability. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Once the America Class LHAs are built and fully integrated and established in the 
amphibious fleet, a continuation of this thesis research can be conducted to actually see 
how the ship is being utilized and how it affects Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and 
missions. The expected data of LHA 6 would then be replaced by actual data in the 
calculations. Physical observations on lift and affects on the MEU could be observed first 
hand. A specific angle to observe and examine is the utilization of vehicle square footage 
 98 
and cargo cube on board LHA 6 as it would be interesting to note what exactly the space 
is being used for (additional aircraft parts or MEU equipment/vehicles/supplies/cargo). 
Further research could also supplement the Navy and Marine Corps’ current analysis on 
future expected vehicle transport and stowage problems to development alternatives to 
meet the requirements. 
Another topic for future research and consideration is to develop doctrine and 
guiding principles for the LHA America class amphibious assault ships. This thesis 
showed that the shift in design violated the current amphibious warfare doctrine. 
Eliminating the well deck certainly changes the shipboard environment and situation for 
the warfighter. Establishing doctrine for the new asset will be the first step in accepting a 
new amphibious fighting machine without its standard capabilities. 
Lastly, future work and analysis can be developed further on the many factors that 
affect the amphibious lift equations and time/distance problem to the beach. For example, 
certain weather and sea states will affect what landing craft and aircraft assets are 
available for an amphibious landing as each has their limitations. A chart can be 
developed to determine what capabilities will be affected during specific weather events 
and sea states that will then add or subtract to the overall time of the amphibious landing. 
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APPENDIX A: CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES 
Table 32.   LHA Tarawa Class Specifications.4  
LHA Tarawa Class Amphibious Assault Ships 
Shipbuilder Ingalls Shipbuilding 
Propulsion Steam turbines, 2 boilers, 2 shafts, 70,000 horsepower 
Length 820 feet 
Beam 106 feet 
Displacement 39,400 tons 
Max Speed 24 knots 
Max Range 10,000 nautical miles 
Fuel Diesel Marine, 5,900 tons 
Crew 1,000 Sailors 
Landing Force 2,000 Marines 
Aircraft Spots 42 (expressed as CH-46 equivalents) 
Landing Craft 4 LCUs or 2 LCUs and 1 LCAC 
Vehicle Storage Area 25,400 square feet 
Cargo Storage Area 105,900 cubic feet 
 
 
Figure 15.   LHA Tarawa Class, USS Tarawa, LHA-1 (From “Avalonn.com Presents 
Letter from the front lines”). 
                                               
4 Information gathered from various sources: “United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious Assault 
Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R),” “LHA-1 Tarawa Class,” and A CBO Study: The Future of the Navy’s 
Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces 4. 
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Table 33.   LCAC Specifications (After “United States Navy Fact File: Landing Craft, Air 
Cushioned” and Textron Marine & Land Systems). 
 
Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) 
Builder Textron Marine and Land Systems 
Propulsion 
4 gas turbine engines, 2 shrouded reversible pitch airscrews, 16,000 
horsepower 
Length 87 feet 11 inches 
Beam 47 feet 
Displacement 87 tons lightly loaded, 170–182 tons with a full load 
Max speed 40–50 knots 
Range 200 nautical miles at 40 knots, 300 nautical miles at 35 knots 
Crew 














Table 34.   LCU Specifications (After “United States Navy Fact File: Landing Craft, 
Mechanized and Utility (LCM/LCU)”). 
Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 
Builder Various shipbuilders of the 1970s 
Propulsion 2 diesel engines, 2 shafts, 680 horsepower 
Length 134.9 feet 
Beam 29 feet 
Displacement 200 tons lightly loaded, 375 tons with a full load 
Max speed 11 knots 
Range 1,200 nautical miles at 8 knots 
Crew 14 personnel 
 
 







Table 35.   AAV Specifications.5  
                                               
5 Information gathered from various sources: “AAV-7 Amphibious Assault Vehicle,” “PMAAVS 
Program Brief” 3, LVTP7 Landing Vehicle, Tracked AAVP7A1 Assault Amphibian Vehicle Personnel,” 
and “AAVs.” 
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Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) 
Builder FMC Corporation 
Propulsion single diesel engine, 400 horsepower 
Length 27 feet 
Width 11 feet 
Height 11 feet 
Max speed 7 knots, cruising speed of 5 knots in water 
Range in water 7 hours at 5 knots, on land 300 miles at 21 knots 




Figure 18.   AAV (From “LVTP7 Landing Vehicle, Tracked AAVP7A1 Assault 
Amphibian Vehicle Personnel”). 
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APPENDIX B: FUTURE AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES 
Table 36.   LHA America Class Specifications.6  
LHA America Class 
Shipbuilder Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 
Propulsion 
2 gas turbine engines, 2 shafts, 70,000 horsepower, 2 5,000 horsepower 
auxiliary motors 
Length 844 feet 
Beam 106 feet 
Displacement 45,000 tons 
Max Speed 22 knots 
Max Range 10,000 nautical miles 
Fuel Diesel Marine, 6,000 tons 
Crew 1,204 Sailors 
Landing Force 1,871 Marines 
Aircraft Spots 45 (expressed as CH-46 equivalents) 
Landing Craft 0 craft, no well deck 
Vehicle Storage 
Area 
10,328 square feet 
Cargo Storage 
Area 
160,000 cubic feet 
 
 
Figure 19.   USS America, LHA-6 (From “LHA-6/LHD-1: ESG Lift Comparison”). 
                                               
6 Information gathered from various sources: “PEO Ships Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA 6): 
Program Summary,” “United States Navy Fact File: Amphibious Assault Ships LHA/LHD/LHA(R),” and 
“LHA 6 Information” 4–6. 
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Table 37.   Osprey Specifications.7  
MV-22 Osprey 
Builder Bell-Boeing 
Engines Rolls-Royce Liberty, 7,000 kilowatts 
Max Cruising Speed 241–257 knots 
Range/Aft Sponson Fuel 
Tank Land-assault missions 242 nm, pre-assault raid 267 nm 
Range/Wing Fuel Tanks Land-assault missions 233 nm, pre-assault raid 306 nm 
Cargo Hook Lift Single 10,000 pounds, dual 15,000 pounds 











                                               
7 Information gathered from various sources: “MV-22 Osprey: Speed, Range and Vertical Flight,” 
Bolkcom Summary and CRS-2, “United States Navy Fact File: V-22A Osprey tilt rotor aircraft,” and “V22 
Characteristics.” 
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Table 38.   F-35 Specifications.8  
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
Builder Lockheed Martin 
Engines F135-PW-100, 40,000 pounds of max thrust 
Length 51.2 feet 
Height 14.3 feet 
Wingspan 35 feet 
Weight Empty 15,000 pounds, max weight 60,000 pounds 
Max Speed 1.6 mach 
Range Combat radius greater than 450 nm, max range greater than 900 nm 
Weapons Payload 15,000 pounds; 2 air-air missiles, 2 1,000 pound guided bombs 
Lift Capability 0, strike only 
 
 
Figure 21.   F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (From “F-35B STOVL Variant: F-35 Lightning II”). 
                                               
8 Information gathered from various sources: “Introduction: F-35,” “F-35B Short Takeoff/Vertical 
Landing Variant,” and “F-35B STOVL Variant: F-35 Lightning II.” 
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